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Abstract 
 This dissertation consists of three essays.  The first essay studies the quantity-quality tradeoff 
by studying China’s one child policy. We utilize the community-level variations in China’s 
One-Child Policy to isolate the actual effects of number of children on the quality of children. 
Based on the instrumental variable approach, we find that having a second child has 
significantly decreased the height of the first child, but had no impact on the weight status of 
the first child. And this quality quantity tradeoff only exists among girls, but not for boys, which 
indicates a son preference in China. By study the underlying mechanism, we find that it is the 
nutrition intake that may explain this quantity-quality tradeoff among children. 
The second paper focuses on the financial impacts of ambulatory surgery centers on 
general surgical hospitals. Ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), which treat surgical patients 
who do not need an overnight stay, are a health care service innovation that has proliferated in 
the United States (U.S.) in the past four decades. This paper examines the effect of ASCs on 
net patient revenues and total operating costs of hospitals. My major contribution is to use an 
exogenous instrumental variable which is the product of change in the over 65 years of age 
population at the county level over the years studied and change in the average Medicare 
payment rate for all ASCs' procedures over the same years. The results of two-stage least 
squares suggest that both hospital revenue and operating expenses will increase when ASCs 
enter the market, with operating expense increasing more, resulting in a decrease in profit 
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margin. I also find that this negative financial impact likely comes from the change in hospital 
inpatient-severity mix upon ASCs' entry. 
The third paper is to assess the effectiveness of Hospital Readmissions Reduction 
Program (HRRP) program implemented in 2012 in the short run by focusing on the acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI) and heart failure (HF) patients. By using a difference in difference 
method, I find that HRRP is not effective in the short run in reducing the readmission in three 
quarters after the program was implemented.   
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Chapter 1: The More The Better? Evidence 
from China’s One Child Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
From Jan. 1st 2016, China’s OCP comes to the end, and all couples are allowed to have two 
children. There are many previous studies showing the negative relationship between the 
quantity and quality of children, and it is important to know what the expected effects of the 
policy change is. While it is too early to examine the effect of Two-child Policy, we are able to 
utilize the variation in the number of children due to different strictness of OCP in different 
areas to examine the effects of the second child on the first. In addition, lessons from China 
can be applied to other developing countries, especially those with limited child welfare 
resources. Our study also contributes to the mainstream of the Quantity-quality (QQ) tradeoff 
research.  
The tradeoff between the quantity and quality of children has long been studied. Since 
families with limited resources tend to have more children and families that pay more attention 
to children’s quality would choose to have fewer children, the direct relationship between 
quality and quantity of children does not indicate a causal relationship. Previous studies mainly 
use instrumental variable (IV) to isolate the true effects of the quantity of children on the quality. 
Multiple births or sex composition of the first two children are frequently used as an IV in 
previous studies (J. Angrist, Lavy, & Schlosser, 2010; Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005; 
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Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1980; Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009). Multiple births are independent of 
family or individual characteristics and they assume that parents whose first two children are 
the same sex are more likely to have additional children. In a recent paper, Liu (2013) uses 
community-level one child policy dummy variable (0 indicates the policy exemption and 1 
indicates the policy implementation) as IVs for quantity of children per household. In Liu’s 
paper, couples are considered as eligible for having two children if any of the following 
condition are met: 1) couples lived in a community where all couples were allowed to have two 
children; 2) couple’s first child was female and they lived in a community where couples were 
allowed to have two children if first born was a girl; 3) ethnic minority couples lived in a 
community where they were allowed to have two children. In our paper, we use a similar IV in 
which we identify the causal relationship between the quantity and the quality of children using 
China’s OCP as a natural experiment. More specifically, we use a community variable based 
on the question “Is every couple in your village/neighborhood allowed to have two children?” 
as the IV. 
In order to avoid contaminated effects from birth order and birth spacing, this paper 
focuses on the first-born single birth only. In addition, we exclude those families with more 
than 2 children. We focus on the first born and exclude families with more than 2 children 
because the current literature identifies birth order and spacing as the two most influential 
cofactors.1 
                                                     
1 Taubman (1986) finds empirical evidence for birth order effects on (age-adjusted) schooling and on earnings 
of young adults in the USA, though the latter is not robust across different specifications. Zajonc and Markus 
(1975)  develops a confluence model to predict positive as well as negative effects of birth order based on data 
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Our main variable of interest in measuring the quality is the standard height and weight 
from the U.K. growth chart 2 . Researchers predominantly tend to use intelligence related 
measures including educational attainment and IQ scores to indicate the quality of children (J. 
Angrist et al., 2010; J. D. Angrist & Evans, 1998; Black et al., 2005; Blake, 1981; Conley & 
Glauber, 2006; Goux & Maurin, 2005; Guo & VanWey, 1999; Hanushek, 1992; J. Lee, 2008; 
Li, Zhang, & Zhu, 2008; Qian, 2009; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1987; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 
1980; Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009; Taubman, 1986; Zajonc & Markus, 1975). Some use labor 
market, marriage, and fertility outcomes to measure the quality (J. Angrist et al., 2010). A few 
study the birth weight related measures (Liu, 2013; Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009). Because 
intelligence related measures have been widely used, we are going to focus on a less explored 
area—children’s weight and height measurements. Moreover, past studies heavily focus on the 
effect of increases in the number of children from two to three or even more. In contrast, our 
paper focuses on the effect of an additional child on the first one.  
                                                     
collected from individuals who had been born during the Dutch famine of 1944. Scientifically, both short (<18 
months) and long (>60 months) birth spacing interval are associated with low birth weight (LBW) and preterm 
birth. Short inter-pregnancy intervals may result in inadequate replenishment of maternal nutrient stores and 
reduced fetal growth (Zhu, Haines, Le, McGrath-Miller, & Boulton, 2001). A mother’s ability to facilitate growth 
to the fetus declines gradually over the year after the first pregnancy. This may lead to preterm birth/LBW in 
mothers with long inter pregnancy intervals(Sharma & Mishra, 2013). 
 
2 Liu (2014) uses the standardizing function based on the U.S. growth chart which only looks at children or 
youth who are 2 years of age or older.  The U.K. version of the standardizing function, on the other hand, 
covers 0-23 years of age. We think it is important to the U.K. version of standardizing function to include 0-2 
infant groups because those stages measurements are critical to predict children's future growth (Alderman, 
Hoddinott, & Kinsey, 2006). In addition, Mozumder, KHUDA, KANE, Levin, and Ahmed (2000) indicate that 
children are at a higher risk of malnutrition if either previous or subsequent siblings were born within 24 
months. Combining the evidence above, an infant who is younger than 2 years old and has an older brother or 
sister is facing a huge disadvantage, but that sample is dropped when using the U.S. standardizing function. 
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Our paper differs from the previous studies in the following ways: First, besides the 
main measures of children’s quality, we also attempt to investigate the underlying mechanism. 
We confirm that nutrition intake explains the relationship between the QQ tradeoff of children 
in China. Second, we use data from 1989 to 2009 to look at the long term trend. Third, we 
investigate the QQ tradeoff within different subsamples. In this paper, we introduce the 
background information about OCP in section 2; describe our sample in section 3; specify our 
empirical strategy in section 4; present the empirical results in section 5; provide extended 
robustness checks in section 6; discuss extensively based on the sub-sample analysis in section 
7 and finally offer our conclusions based on the analysis in section 8.  
2. Background of China’s One Child Policy 
The QQ tradeoff we mentioned previously is an important incentive for the Chinese 
government to conduct a birth control plan. 3  In fact, besides the fearful environmental 
consequences and possible economic development drawbacks from the enormous growth in 
population, one of the prime goals of controlling the population in China is to improve the 
population quality in the Communist Party of China’s  (CPC) agenda (Greenhalgh & Winckler, 
2005). The key draftsmen of the OCP in the early Deng era were all scientists and they treated 
OCP in a scientific way. After studies and researches, they believed continued rapid human 
number growth will hold back human capital development in China during their time 
                                                     
3 There are many slogan variants of quantity-quality trade-off to promote China’s OCP among local residents. 
Classic ones include "One child only is the best" "Human beings only have one earth and hence we must 
control population growth”,"Fewer and healthier (baby), Happy life forever" , "Low fertility, good quality, both 
boys and girls are treasurers". 
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(Greenhalgh, 2008). Although there are people who believe birth control is not necessary,4 the 
QQ tradeoff provides theoretical support for the government.  
Most literature to date has regarded the 1980s as the period in which the OCP was 
formed; however, the idea of the OCP actually can be traced to as early as 1950. Based on 
Greenhalgh and Winckler (2005), the OCP policy can be divided into four periods: Mao’s era, 
Deng’s era, Jiang’s era, and Hu’s era. Mao’s era is composed of a lot of turbulence: both the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had added great noise to the formation and 
implementation of the OCP. Therefore, even though the concept and practice of state planning 
of births was invented during Mao’s era, there were next to none specific practical instructions 
to guide the implementation. More specifically, Mao Zedong strategically advocated family 
planning and birth control but he was not sure how to implement it among farmers which 
comprised the majority of the Chinese population then and sometimes that uncertainty led to 
self-contradictory stands. The big changes happened in Deng’s era (late 1970s to late 1980s). 
                                                     
4 There are people who argue that population control is unnecessary. Hartmann (1995) charges that the 
philosophy underlying population control measures assumes that "1) rapid population growth is a primary 
cause of development problems, 2) people must be persuaded or forced to have fewer children even before 
their standard of living is improved, 3) birth control services can be delivered in a top-down fashion in the 
absence of basic health care systems, and 4) contraceptive efficacy is more important than safety." His book 
rejects these assumptions by explaining that "1) rapid population growth is a symptom, not a cause, of 
development problems; 2) the best way to motivate people to have fewer children is by improving living 
standards and women's status; and 3) health, safety, and individual control over a method should be the 
primary concerns in the development and promotion of contraceptive technology that should be offered 
through a popularly based health care system." While a lot of his charges and suggestions are practical, 
constructive and intriguing, his first charge is controversial and questionable. If abundant population quantity 
causes the low quality, then rapid growth is indeed a primary cause of the development problems because 
human capital is the essential part of any development plan. Therefore, it is imperative to verify the validity of 
quantity-quality tradeoff, not only in the case of China, but also for international population policies at large.  
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The OCP was officially announced in 1979. Local cadres were given economic incentives to 
suppress fertility rates. “Document 7” , issued on April 13, 1984, was a landmark in the sense 
that it allowed for regional variation in family planning policies to curb female infanticide. It 
allowed rural couples to have a second child if the first one was a girl (so called “1.5 child” 
rule). It also forbade forced abortion and forced sterilization. Local governments were officially 
granted the right to issue permits for a second child. Another landmark was accession of Peng 
Peiyun as the new birth program leader in early 1988 to correct the soft implementation of the 
OCP which was reflected by a reversed downward trend in fertility in 1986-1987. Peng greatly 
reinforced the OCP in the following 5 years from 1989-1993. Fast forward to Jiang’s era 
(roughly 1989-2003) which was a period of deep reform for hard birth planning. According  to 
Greenhalgh and Winckler (2005), Jiang’s era began with “a phase of controlled consolidation: 
state-centric reforms to correct program maladministration, to professionalize birth work and 
to improve positive incentives for citizen to compliance”. However, unlike the middle of the 
Deng period, that quasi-consolidation did not involve inadvertent relaxation of enforcement. 
Basically, Jiang was a hardliner.  Hu Jintao came on to the stage at the right time to use the 
right approach to ease the tension between the government and public which formed due to 
Jiang’s hard approach so that he could continue to successfully implement the OCP. Hu’s era 
(2003-2012) began with his new ideology--a “scientific concept of development”. Hu’s reforms 
had two major perspectives: a scientific perspective and a democratic perspective. The 
scientific perspective is not new--Deng’s administration had already treated the population 
problem as a scientific problem rather than social problem. In fact, the person in charge during 
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Deng’s time was Song Jian, who was a scientist trained in Moscow before he assumed office.  
Hu’s administration deepened the role of science by strategically planning and optimizing 
government’s structure to further smooth the implementation of the OCP. Democratic 
perspective can be seen by deviating away from punishment approach by including more 
economic incentives for compliance. Additionally, Hu Jintao fully promoted “human-centered, 
comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable” development during the March 2004 National 
People’s Congress.  Unlike during previous eras when the public had to gain permits, citizens 
now could decide the timing of their childbearing as long as they were within the legal limits 
on the number of children they could have. 
The OCP is a long term scientific national birth planning policy which is well 
implemented during the late Deng era, Jiang era and Hu era and it is extremely effective and 
strictly implemented since Jiang Zemin. The majority of data was collected in Jiang’s era so it 
is a great indication that our IV is valid since Jiang implemented OCP strictly. We want to 
emphasize that OCP is a dynamic process. The OCP was constantly evolving in the time 
window of 1978-1988. The OCP became relatively stable after the Document 7. Even one year 
before Document 7, there was a disturbing incident: the director of the State Family Planning 
Commission, Qian Zhongxin, forged very strict and sometimes inhuman family planning 
policies. In the year of 1983, the frequency of intra-uterine device, sterilization, and abortion 
were as high as ever. Since then, he was laid off and never appointed again. That incident 
strongly suggests that we should focus on children born in or after 1985, which is the stage that 
OCP becomes fairly stable.  
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3. Data 
According to the official website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china), the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) is a collaborative project between the Carolina Population 
Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition 
and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Its main goal is to 
study the effects of the health, nutrition, and family planning policies and programs 
implemented by national and local governments and examine the dynamic impact of the 
economic transformation of Chinese society on the health and nutritional status of its 
population. The survey is collected over a 3-day period with a sample of about 4,400 
households, including 26,000 individuals in nine provinces. In addition, detailed community 
data were collected. 
 In this paper, data from 1989--2009 are used. Firstly we exclude people who have 
appeared in the same wave more than once, and then merged all the data based on individual 
unique ID and wave. We use the community-level one child policy as an IV, which is based on 
whether all couples are allowed to have two children in the neighborhood.  Next, we use a 
relationship data file to match each child to their parents. We are interested in the standardized 
height and weight.  The sample is further restricted to those who were born after or in 1985 as 
mentioned above. Document 7 in 1984 opened a new chapter and introduced the basic model 
of the modern OCP. We regard 1985 as the starting point of a relatively stable and consistent 
OCP period. We dropped observations with missing dependent variables (such as height and 
weight) and independent variables (such as household income and age).   
 Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.1.  Statistics for the whole sample differ from 
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our selected sample which is restricted to families whose first born was after or in 1985. More 
importantly, families under a restricted OCP (treatment group) have a lot of similar 
characteristics compared to those which are allowed to have two children (control group). Both 
groups’ parents have similar education levels up to upper middle school and give birth at similar 
ages. It is expected that the treatment group has fewer kids than the control group.  The only 
significant difference in the comparison is that the treatment group tends to be richer than the 
control group. We think it is fair to say that the treatment and control groups have similar 
observable characteristics. This similarity demonstrates that our IV is not likely to be correlated 
with household characteristics.  As far as dependent variables, our selected sample tends to be 
taller and heavier than the whole sample. However, the whole sample tends to have higher 
intake of calories, protein and carbohydrate and less fat intake. This could be due to the fact 
that the average age of the whole sample is 2 years older than our sample.  Treatment and 
control groups in our sample have less than a one year age difference, and treat group tends to 
be significantly taller and heavier.  
Numerous medical journals have contributed the height growth to nutrition intake and 
based on current medical literature, balanced nutrition is the key for height growth (Adamson, 
Rugg-Gunn, Butler, Appleton, & Hackett, 1992; Cadogan, Eastell, Jones, & Barker, 1997; Gary 
M. Chan, Karen Hoffman, & Martha McMurry, 1994; Gibson et al., 1989; Johnston Jr et al., 
1992; W. T. Lee et al., 1995; Pluske, Williams, & Aherne, 1996; Prynne et al., 2006). Some 
authors even use height and weight data to compare the nutritional status of groups of children 
(Waterlow et al., 1977). We think that looking at a single nutrition component separately is 
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insufficient for identifying the mechanism. So, we created a nutrition index based on multiple 
nutrition intakes which is explained in the next section.  As a side note, standard heights and 
weights have negative values because Chinese children are shorter and lighter relative to the 
median of U.S. children in the same age cohort. 
4. Identification strategy 
First of all, we want to emphasize that the OCP is a national policy, although it was 
implemented at local cadres starting in the mid-1980s. There are two penitential problems with 
the validity of the IV: first, the local cadres do not implement the OCP regardless of the order 
from the central government; second, different neighborhoods with different endogenous 
factors face different OCP policies. The first violation is easy to dispute since only 4.06% of 
the local cadres did not implement family planning over all waves based on the community 
survey data. We next prove that the IV is uncorrelated with neighborhood/community 
characteristics. 
 There are 234 communities over all waves. Figure 1.1 shows the variable average which 
is whether all couples are allowed to have two children in the village/neighborhood at province 
level (0 means two children per couple is forbidden and 1 otherwise). Except for Guangxi and 
Guizhou (based on the fifth population census, those two provinces are among the four highest 
minority concentrated provinces which have more than 10 million minority population), all 
other provinces have a relatively strict OCP that does not allow for two children for the most 
parts (Heilongjiang only entered the survey in 1997 to make up for Laoning’s absence and 
remains in the survey since then). There is a consistent huge drop among all provinces in 1991 
(except for Heilongjiang which is not surveyed in 1991). It implies that although local cadres 
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had their own implementation leeway, the central government has great power over local 
cadres to make a national move.  What happened in 1991 is that there was a much stronger 
enforcement of a stricter version of the OCP in 1991. One representative event is that the CPC 
Central Committee and the State Council issued Document 9 in May: “Decision on 
Strengthening Family Planning Work to Control Population Growth”.  In that document, it 
states: "Party committees and governments should assume responsibility for the completion of 
the region’s population plan. They should also implement and improve the population control 
and family planning responsibility system. The assessment of the population control should be 
an important indicator of party committees’ achievement of leading cadres at all levels of 
government and … Higher Party committees and governments should strengthen the 
supervision of implementation of population control at subordinate committees and ensure the 
accuracy of the statistics of family planning results. Concealed and/or false report should be 
strictly forbidden … Any negligence of duty which causes loss of control of the population 
should be investigated and relevant leaders should be held accountable." The earliest survey 
date in 1991 was August 10th and the latest one was December 24th. It is obvious that the 
national policy announced in May greatly impacted local cadres only several months later. 
Therefore, this is our first evidence that the OCP should be an exogenous IV because it is very 
nationally controlled in nature based on our data sample. Moreover, since the empty dots 
indicate that the number of observations is relatively stable, this big drop is unlikely to be 
caused by some accidental number of observation movements. 
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Next, we will prove empirically that the IV is unrelated with most community 
characteristics. Here we use the twelve neighborhood variables developed by Jones-Smith and 
Popkin (2010)5. All variables were surveyed each year from 1991 to 2006 with a few exceptions. 
Smith and Popkin use those characteristics to study urbanity and those 12 measurements are a 
comprehensive summary of the community characteristics. We have to prove that policy is 
exogenous to those measurements. Our regression is listed as follows: 
Policyi = β0 + Charitβ1 + Xitβ2 + Zitβ3 + τt + ζp + τt × ζp + εipt,                                (1) 
where Policyi  is the OCP household i faced, and Charit  are the 11 characteristics of the 
neighborhood proposed by Smith and Popkin (2010) . Notice that the neighborhood education 
level is excluded because we measured the educational environment at a finer level by 
including mother’s educational attainment as controls. 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of the child’s 
characteristics including gender, age, age squared, and 𝑍𝑖𝑡 represents a set of parental attributes 
including maternal educational attainments and age at children’s birth, as well as the log of 
household income. We have also controlled for province fixed effects and wave fixed effects, 
as well as a province-specific time trend which is the product of the province dummies and 
wave dummies. Only the educational outcomes of mothers are controlled for (there are more 
missing values for father’s educational outcomes). Controlling for mother's education is critical 
because numerous studies have proven that mother's education level affects a child’s height 
(Duncan, 1994; Duncan Thomas, 1991). Also, Savage et al. (2013) find that mother's age at 
                                                     
5 See appendix Table A1 for detail.   
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birth is positively correlated with child height. Hence, we include mother's age at birth as one 
of the controls as well. If we include father’s educational attainment and age at birth as a 
robustness check, the results are similar and shown in Table 1.5 Panel B. All standard errors 
are clustered at the province_rural level which is created by the product of province dummies 
and rural dummies to account for rural and urban difference.  All community characteristics 
are lagged by one period. Data are collapsed at the community level. 
 Results are presented in Table 1.2. We see that four of the neighborhood characteristics 
have influence on the OCP policy. As a robustness check, we add in all the four significant 
community characteristics into our main regression which is shown below. And the results are 
shown in Table 1.5 Panel D. The finding is that after adding those significant community 
characteristics, the conclusion is not altered and results are still significant.    
 Our main empirical model is described as follows: 
quality 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + quantity𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽3 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 × 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡,                         (2) 
where quality 𝑖𝑡  is measured by the standardized weight and height, and quantity𝑖𝑡 is the 
number of children in the household. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, which measures impacts 
of number of children on the quality of children. For example, a negative sign of 𝛽1 indicates 
a tradeoff between quantity and quality of children. 𝑋𝑖𝑡  and 𝑍𝑖𝑡  are the same as above and 
regression is also clustered at province_rural level. In a 2SLS setting, the above equation is the 
second stage, and the first stage is specified as  
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quantity𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + policy𝑖𝛼1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛼3 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 × 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡,                      (3)                                                
where policy𝑖 is the OCP household i faced. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖𝑡 are the same as above and regression 
is clustered at province_rural level. 
 We want to explain more about 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖. The main IV, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖, is the status of the OCP 
at the community level. Family planning constraint is unbounded if the couple decides only to 
have one kid. Thus, the OCP only matters for couples who would like to have more than one 
child. Therefore, we use the policy variable followed by the first born as our IV. For example, 
we impose the 2009 policy for families with first born's birth year between 2006 and 2009. 
Another approach would be using the policy variable in one year prior to the second born. This 
approach might be more accurate given the fact that one year or probably two years before the 
second born is the time period that the couples decide to have a second child. However, we 
would not be able to assign IV to those families with only one child, which are essentially the 
control group in our sample. Therefore, we use the first method. 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1  Weight and Height Outcomes 
The main results about the impact of the number of children on the weight and height outcomes 
of children are shown in Table 1.3. We present the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results in 
columns 1 and 3. The estimates of -0.169 and -0.234 indicate that an additional child reduces 
the standard height and weight of the first child by 0.169 and 0.234 standard deviations, 
respectively. The IV results are presented in columns 2 and 4. First of all, the first stage is 
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statistically significant at the 1% level which implies that the local one child policy has a 
significant impact on the number of children. The first stage result has its own merit: if couples 
are allowed to have two children in their community, the average number of children increases 
by 0.17. The estimate of -0.681 (Column 2 of Table 1.3) indicates that an additional child would 
decrease the height of the first-born child by 0.681 standard deviations. Compared with the 
OLS results, the 2SLS yields much larger estimates, which implies a downward bias caused by 
the endogeneity. 6 In contrast, a second child will not affect the weight of the first-born child. 
There are numerous medical journal articles that have indicated that height growth is highly 
dependent on nutrition intake (Adamson, Rugg-Gunn, Butler, Appleton, & Hackett, 1992; 
Cadogan, Eastell, Jones, & Barker, 1997; Gary M. Chan, Karen Hoffman, & Martha McMurry, 
1994; Gibson et al., 1989; Johnston Jr et al., 1992; W. T. Lee et al., 1995; Pluske, Williams, & 
Aherne, 1996; Prynne et al., 2006). In the economic literature, Thomas (1994) argues that 
height reflects children's long-run nutritional status and is closely related to their mental 
development, mortality and income in adulthood. Liu (2013) finds that the number of siblings 
increases children's cereal consumptions but decreases their meat consumption. However, such 
a finding hardly reflects overall nutrition intake. In the next section, we define a nutrition index 
and prove that the nutrition intake is the invisible hand behind height growth.  
 We also witness a positive relationship between the mother’s education level and 
children’s height. In particular, starting from lower middle school, more educated mothers tend 
                                                     
6 Liu (2013) also finds much smaller OLS results and a much larger 2SLS results for the standardized height in 
his paper. 
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to have taller and heavier children. This fact reflects that the way the children are raised has a 
profound impact. It appears that a mother with higher educational attainment put more effort 
and have the correct knowledge to raise their child well. Additionally, the older a child becomes, 
the smaller the difference is.  
The positive coefficient of log household income indicates that households with higher 
income tend to have bigger children. Household income should have a direct impact on the 
nutrition quality and quantity that the children are endowed within China. Results imply that 
poorer families might not be able to supply all of the nutrition that their children need. 
5.2 Underlying Reason 
In this section, we study the possible underlying mechanism. More specifically, we investigate 
the impact of number of children on the parents’ children care time, smoking and drinking 
behaviors of children, and nutrition intake. Except for the nutrition intake, none of the factors 
has an impact. Therefore, we use the nutrition intake as an example to explain the regression 
specification.  
𝑧ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 𝛽2 + 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝛽3 + 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1𝛽4 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1𝛽5 +
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑡−1𝛽6 + 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡−1𝛽7 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 × 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡,                                                           (4)                                                                                                                                                       
and use the predicted value of 𝑧ℎ𝑖𝑡 as 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡. I purposely use the previous period nutrient and 
cereal intake to predict the standard height in the current period. The nutrition intake survey 
only started in 1991, because we are using a lagged nutrient intake, effectively we are dropping 
observations from year 1989 and 1991. We include age, gender, year and province fixed effects 
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and year and province interaction dummies in the regression. However, when we predict the 
standard height  𝑧ℎ𝑖𝑡, we run a partial prediction based on cereal, protein, carbohydrates and 
fat intake from the previous period only.  Before we go deeper, we want to verify this index 
does predict standard height very well in our main regression. So we run the following 
regression: 
𝑧ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛼1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛼3 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 × 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡,                                   (5)                                                           
The coefficient of index is 0.425 with a standard error of 0.17, indicating that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at 5% level. It proves that the nutrition index does explain the standard 
height very well. 
Next, we run 2SLS again.  Second stage is: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽3 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 × 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡,                         (6)                                                                        
And first stage is: 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝛼1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛼3 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 × 𝜁𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡,                         (7)                                                                 
 Results are shown in Table 1.4. The first stage is statistically significant at 5%. Based 
on the second stage results, we know that one additional child reduces the nutrition index of 
the first born by 0.259. So, the mechanism channel has been established: more children lower 
the nutritional intake of the first born and a lower nutrition intake further decreases the height 
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of the first born.7 We believe that we are the first to establish such a mechanism by using the 
CHNS dataset. 
We also find that the total time parents spend on their children is not affected by the 
number of kids in the family and the probability of drinking or smoking is not related to the 
number of children in the family. Results are shown in columns 1 through 4 of Table 1.4.  
6. Robustness Check 
 
6.1 Insurance Status 
Since children’s access to health care should affect their health situation and subsequently body 
shape significantly, we further control for insurance status in this subsection. The results are 
shown in Panel A of Table 1.5, and the results are nearly identical to our main results.  
6.2 Father’s Education and Age at Child’s Birth 
In the main results, we only include the mother’s educational information in order to preserve 
the size of the dataset. This is due to the fact that variables relating to fathers have more missing 
values than mothers. However, father’s education level and age at children’s birth should have 
an important impact on children’s stature too. Duncan Thomas (1991) finds that in the U.S., 
                                                     
7 In the mechanism study above, the variables of fat, protein and carbohydrate are only available after 1991. 
Hence, we want to make sure 1991-2009 samples produces similar results.  In order to exactly replicate the sample 
which is used to create the index above, we dropped observations with missing values on cereal, protein, 
carbohydrate or fat intake. And then we run our 2sls regressions again on this modified sample.  The results are 
presented in Panel A of Table 10. The results are very identical to our main results in Table 5. Subsequently, we 
can extrapolate the results to our whole sample which is from 1989-2009 and deduct that the nutrition intake must 
also be the underlying mechanism of decreased height.  
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Brazil, and Ghana, the education of the mother has a bigger effect on her daughter's height; 
paternal education, in contrast, has a bigger impact on his son's height. As a result, we include 
father’s educational attainment and age at children's birth as a robustness check. As shown in 
Panel B of Table 1.5, the sample size is reduced from 4,333 to 4,172 but the QQ tradeoff is still 
statistically significant and results remain almost unchanged.8  
6.3 Parent’s Height 
Genetic endowment is one of the biggest concerns of the QQ tradeoff study. Previous studies 
already confirm that the influence of parental height on children's height is evident (Kagan & 
Moss, 1959; Leger, Limoni, Collin, & Czernichow, 1998). We want to include maternal and/or 
paternal height to control genetic endowment. In our sample, the minimum for a mother is 19 
with a mean value of 33.5 and fathers have a minimum age of 21 with a mean value of 35.1. 
There are slight variations of the height for the same individual over different waves. We 
attribute this variation to the random measurement error since both mothers and fathers in our 
sample are adults and their heights should not change significantly over the years. To control 
for such measurement error, we use the average height across all waves to represent parents' 
height. We first include mother's height and then include both parents' heights as controls. 
Results are shown in Panel C of Table 1.5. Maternal and paternal heights are highly significant 
(results not shown) with a p value less than 1%. However, the coefficient of standard first born 
child height remains significant even with the inclusion of maternal and paternal heights. This 
                                                     
8 We also run a regression only controlling for the mother’s information, but use the same sample size as the 
father’s sample, and the results are robust. 
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is a strong signal that aside from genetic endowments, the number of children in the family 
does have an impact on the quality of the first born. 
7. Discussion  
 
7.1 Social-economics Status 
In this subsection, we want to examine whether better social-economic status can help to buffer 
the negative impact on the first child from an additional child. We first look at the impact from 
income. Gilbert (2002) defines families with household income in the top 45% as the middle 
class or above. We adopt this cutoff and divide the population into two groups: those who are 
middle class or above and those who are below the middle class. The first stage result suggests 
that the OCP has more power on the working class or poor people. It is understandable given 
the fact that richer families are in a much better position to face fines or other government 
punishment for a violation of the rules. Moreover, the QQ tradeoff is only reflected in families 
who are below the middle class and the scale is very similar to our main results (col. 2 of Table 
1-6). It supports our hypothesis that resource constraints that cause the shorter height of the 
first born in the family with more than one child.  
We next examine the impact of mother’s education. From Panel B of Table 1.6, we find 
that children will suffer from QQ tradeoff only if mothers have low educational attainment 
(below high school). 
In order to provide further evidence about the effects of social economic status, we look 
at the QQ tradeoff in relatively poor areas of China, which are generally the western parts. We 
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restrict our sample to only include Guizhou, Guangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan provinces. 
The QQ tradeoff is much larger in the poorer areas of China, implying that nutrition intake 
might be the key reason for the QQ tradeoff because household in poorer area cannot afford 
nutritious food.9  
7.2 Son Preference 
Parents in China face income or resource constraints when raising more children, and having 
more children increases the possibility of heavy fines and loss of jobs. “At least a boy” is an 
important reason for parents to have additional children, especially in the rural areas of China. 
In fact, the first born being a girl is an incentive for a lot of parents to have a second child and 
later versions of the OCP incorporated this reality in order to make it more practical. This 
“more boys” fetish can be partly explained by the culture and economic background where 
parents believe more kids, especially boys, imply higher labor productivity and better 
protection in their older age. Therefore, a first born girl is likely to sacrifice for creating more 
growth space for her younger brothers or sisters. Whether first born girls sacrifice for brothers 
only or for both brothers and sisters is left for future researchers.  
We divide the sample by gender to explore the potential gender differences in the QQ 
tradeoff. As demonstrated in panel A of Table 1.7, the tradeoff between quantity and quality is 
significant only among girls, and the effects turn out to be large (close to 1 standard deviation). 
This is consistent with the preference for sons in China, where sons tend to be given better care 
                                                     
9 Results are not shown, but available upon request.  
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and resources, which can help to buffer the negative impact from the increase in the number of 
children.  
In addition, we want to explore differences among households with different income 
levels. Families with high household income (which can be used to represent social-economic 
status) tend to negate the negative quantity effect on the quality of a first born girl. Household 
income does not play a critical role in the case of male first born children (results are not shown). 
This confirms again that there is a boy fetish: girls in the wealthier families are better off, while 
boys' quality is not affected by income. The results above imply that when the resources are 
limited, boys are given more resources.  
The preference for sons is greatly affected by the parents' education level because less 
educated parents tend to believe in certain social doctrine without any second thought. To test 
this hypothesis, we group the sample based on whether the mother has a high school diploma. 
Because we want to see the difference at a broader category level, mother's educational controls 
are dropped from the original regression. Panel C of Table 1.7 shows that if the mother has a 
high school diploma, the disadvantage for a first born girl vanishes but if the mother does not 
have a high school diploma, the first girl faces significant disadvantages. Therefore, a mother's 
education significantly affects children's quantity and quality tradeoff for first born girls. 
7.3 Children’s Age  
Based on Table 1.8, we can see that a child younger than 14 is affected negatively by having 
more children in the family and the scale is bigger than the original result which is 0.804 for 
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children who are younger than 7 years old. The first stage is not statistically significant for 
children aged 14 or above. We find that children aged 14 or above are born between 1985 and 
1995 with a mean birth year 1988.13 and a standard deviation of 2.6. Figure1.2 shows the 
histogram of the birth year distribution. Most children over the age of it were born between 
1985 and 1990. This is a period when the OCP was loosened to limit the backlash created by 
the director of the State Family Planning Commission, Qian Xinzhong, in 1983 by his very 
strict and sometimes inhuman approach to birth control. However, this period was ended by 
Jiang Zemin in 1991 due to his document to strengthen OCP implementation. Therefore, it is 
not surprising to see that first stage is not significant for children aged 14 because most of them 
were born during the time when the OCP was loosely implemented.10 
8. Conclusion and Implication 
This paper estimates the effect of family size on the stature of children in China. It overcomes 
the obstacles of joint determination by exploiting the exogenous variation in the number of 
children allowed by China’s One Child Policy. The results show that parents with bigger family 
sizes breed shorter children. Our findings provide empirical evidence for a novel insight into 
                                                     
10 Reader might question the 14 age cutoff. We meant to distinguish children from teenager. A teenager, or teen, 
is a young person whose age falls within the range from 13–19. They are called teenagers because their age number 
ends in "teen". Someone aged 18 or 19 is also considered a young adult. The UN, for statistical consistency across 
regions, defines 'youth', as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years, without prejudice to other 
definitions by Member States. In any case, we want to show that our results are robustness to different cutoff 
standards. In the following panels of Table 6, we show the results for cutoff at age 12, 13 and 15 and our main 
conclusion is not changed. Additionally, for children older than 13 and 15, the first stage is barely significant 
which supports our conjecture about the insignificant first stage above. Also, the smaller the cutoff, the more 
significant the effect is. It implies that the trade off normally happens at young children group instead of the youth 
group.  
 
26 
 
the quantity-quality tradeoff in China’s context and confirm the existence of such a trade-off. 
Empirical evidence also suggests that resource constraints cause the quantity-quality tradeoff. 
More specifically, first born children in bigger families take less nutrition. Becker and Lewis 
(1974) demonstrate that the observed income elasticity of demand with respect to the quality 
of children exceeds income elasticity with respect to quantity, while at the same time the 
observed price elasticity with respect to quantity is greater than price elasticity with respect to 
quality. Their analysis explains the empirical QQ tradeoff identified in our paper from the 
income and cost perspective. Income and cost actually boil down to the resource constraints. 
Blake (1981) uses U.S. data with whites primarily and finds evidence of the “dilution model”— 
on average, the more children in a family, the lower quality of each child due to diluted 
resources on each child. Again, his paper supports our empirical finding and the constrained 
nutrition intake mechanism. A similar QQ tradeoff in human capital has been identified in India 
(Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1980), France (Goux & Maurin, 2005), U.S.A (Conley & Glauber, 
2006) and China (Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009).  We also find that young first born girls in poor 
families are most negatively affected by additional siblings because they tend to be 
disadvantaged when resources are constrained.  
  Liu (2013) concludes that the number of children has a significant negative effect on 
both boy’s and girl’s height. The trade-off is stronger for boys at the lower half of the height 
distribution, but it does not vary systematically across the height distribution for girls. The IV 
estimates for boys suggest that the impact could vary from 0.453 (SE = 0.232) to 0.511 (SE = 
0.183) standard deviations and his IV estimates for girls are almost identical to that for boys. 
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In contrast, by using a much larger sample, better data cleaning approaches,  and updated data 
with more accurate matching between parents and children, we find that the QQ tradeoff is 
concentrated on the first born girl while the first born boy is largely unaffected, which is 
consistent with the preference for boys in a lot of areas of China. Our IV estimates for girls are 
much larger at 0.921. Given so much research on traditional Patriarchal China and its derived 
boy fetish (e.g. (Coser, 1986) ), we strongly believe that it is unlikely that there is no significant 
difference between girls and boys. Plenty of news reports alert us that in rural China, girls not 
only are given less food, but some of them are also denied their educational rights because the 
boys in the family are the priority given limited resources. We believe that our results are much 
more realistic and convincing. Liu also uses meat and cereal consumption as the only indicators 
of nutrition intake. Instead, we develop a nutrition index based on some of the actual nutrient 
measures and cereal intake and find evidence to support the hypothesis that nutrition intake is 
the key for stunted growth.  
 Our paper has great policy implications: the government should start to pay attention to 
first born girls in poor families with multiple children. Since their reduced quality is caused by 
resource constraints, the government should find a way to provide subsidies to help those girls 
to grow bigger and healthier. Also, it is time to build up a comprehensive child welfare system 
so that children's health or growth is not constrained by family social economic status.  
However, there are several caveats that we need to pay attention to when explaining 
our results. First of all, our study is based on a Chinese sample, and the results may not be able 
28 
 
to generalize to other areas due to some unique characteristics of China: 1) China has a large 
proportion of rural population; 2) Chinese people have a strong preference for sons; and 3) the 
child care system is not well built in China. Second, due to the limitations/ variations in the 
number of children, we mainly focus on the impact of a second child on the first one, and the 
relationship may change as the number of children continues to increase. Last but not least, the 
number of children may be underreported since unstipulated children cannot get Hukou, a 
record in the system of household registration required by law in mainland China.  
The Quantity-Quality tradeoff should also be reflected in other characteristics of 
children. Future research could add in population census data in China to discover additional 
quantity-quality tradeoff phenomena. We also believe there is more than one possible causal 
mechanism, such as parents’ behaviors, but we are not able to identify this due data limitations. 
Future researchers can explore this in more detail with additional data.  
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Figure 1.1  One Child Policy Trend 
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Figure 1.2 Birth Year Distribution 
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Figure 1.3 Mean of Standardized Height by Number of Kids 
 
 
*The fence is at the value of 1 standard deviation. Orange line indicates the mean value. 
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
  
Whole 
Sample 
First Born  Treat Control 
after 1985 2 Not Allowed 2 Allowed 
Number of Kids in Family 1.81  1.36  1.23  1.52  
Male 0.54  0.54  0.54  0.56  
Age 11.52  9.33  9.69  8.98  
Household Gross Income Log Value 9.05  9.20  9.43  8.88  
Mother: Primary (%) 23.30% 22.20% 21.70% 22.50% 
Mother: Lower Middle School (%) 29.60% 39.90% 39.30% 41.30% 
Mother: Upper Middle School (%) 11.00% 16.30% 16.80% 14.90% 
Mother: Technology Education (%) 2.79% 6.37% 8.84% 3.21% 
Mother: University Degree (%) 1.45% 3.48% 5.26% 0.97% 
Mother: Master Degree or Higher (%) 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% 
Mother's age at Birth 26.61  24.20  24.44  23.84  
Father: Primary (%) 24.30% 16.50% 15.00% 18.20% 
Father:  Lower Middle School (%) 38.70% 46.50% 44.30% 49.10% 
Father:  Upper Middle School (%) 16.50% 20.50% 20.80% 19.70% 
Father:  Technology Education (%) 3.31% 5.94% 7.90% 3.93% 
Father: University Degree (%) 2.74% 5.37% 7.90% 2.25% 
Father:  Master Degree or Higher (%) 0.07% 0.12% 0.23% 0.00% 
Father's  age at Birth 28.34  25.82  26.13  25.27  
Standardized Height -0.61  -0.16  0.07  -0.43  
Standardized Weight -0.64  -0.24  -0.05  -0.45  
Calories Intake (cal) 1951.00  1775.00  1767.00  1802.00  
Fat Intake (g) 53.58  57.34  59.57  54.07  
Protein Intake (g) 58.59  54.60  54.76  54.76  
Carbohydrate Intake (g) 305.00  258.00  248.60  274.30  
Number of observation is 4,333 for the sample with first born after 1985. 
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Table 1.2 Community Characteristics Coefficients 
No. Variable Policy 
1 Population Density 0.0285 
  (0.0220) 
2 Economic Activity -0.0133 
  (0.00892) 
3 Traditional Markets -0.0167*** 
  (0.00535) 
4 Modern Markets -0.00721 
  (0.00598) 
5 Transportation Infrastructure -0.00397 
  (0.00913) 
6 Sanitation -0.0191 
  (0.0133) 
7 Communications 0.0446** 
  (0.0164) 
8 Housing 0.0192 
  (0.0119) 
9 Diversity 0.0463* 
  (0.0258) 
10 Health Infrastructure -0.0120 
  (0.0156) 
11 Social services 0.0375*** 
    (0.0106) 
The sample size is 1208. Data are collapsed at the community level. Gender, age, mother’s education level and age at 
birth, household income, year fixed effects, province fixed effects and province and year interactive dummies are 
included as controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.3 Main Results 
VARIABLES Standardized Height Standardized Weight 
Policy OLS IV OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Kids -0.169*** -0.681** -0.234*** -0.396 
 (0.0507) (0.299) (0.0454) (0.303) 
Primary School (Mother) 0.135 0.0893 0.0756 0.0611 
 (0.0782) (0.0781) (0.0847) (0.0896) 
Lower Middle School 
(Mother) 
0.380*** 0.296*** 0.214*** 0.188** 
 (0.0780) (0.0826) (0.0652) (0.0806) 
Upper Middle School 
(Mother) 
0.613*** 0.474*** 0.447*** 0.403*** 
 (0.0886) (0.118) (0.0809) (0.113) 
Technical Institute (Mother) 0.697*** 0.488*** 0.537*** 0.471*** 
 (0.0977) (0.126) (0.102) (0.147) 
University Degree (Mother) 0.730*** 0.525*** 0.541*** 0.477*** 
 (0.152) (0.178) (0.136) (0.177) 
Master Degree (Mother) 0.482*** 0.580*** 0.164 0.195 
 (0.0951) (0.135) (0.197) (0.181) 
Log of Household Income  0.0625** 0.0522** 0.0555*** 0.0523*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0263) (0.0171) (0.0193) 
Age -0.137*** -0.0892*** -0.0712*** -0.0561* 
 (0.0231) (0.0344) (0.0213) (0.0334) 
Sample Size 4,333 4,333 4,333 4,333 
A community variable based on the question “Is every couple in your village/neighborhood allowed to have two children?” is used as the 
IV. Number of kids per family is the key explanatory variable. Province and year fixed effects are included. First stage coefficient for the 
IV approach is statistically significant at 1% level with a value of 0.17 and a standard deviation of 0.0516. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4 Underlying Mechanism 
VARIABLES 
Log 
(Father's 
Care Time) 
Log 
(Mother's 
Care Time 
Smoking Drinking Index 
Number of Kids 0.151 0.199 0.0132 0.0454 -0.259*** 
 (0.960) (0.472) (0.214) (0.142) (0.0819) 
      
Sample Size 713 1,347 1,255 1,670 2,188 
Child characteristics including gender and age and mother’s educational attainment are included as controls. . Province and year fixed effects 
are also included. A community variable based on the question “Is every couple in your village/neighborhood allowed to have two children?” is 
used as the IV. First stage coefficient for is statistically significant at 1% level with a value of 0.17 and a standard deviation of 0.0516 for all the 
column except for the index column. For the index column, the first stage is 5% significant with a value of 0.148. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 1.5 Robustness Check 
VARIABLES Standardized Height Standardized Weight 
 Panel A:  Insurance Status (N=3,913) 
Number of Kids -0.683** -0.391 
 (0.283) (0.298) 
 Panel B: Father's Education  and Age at Children's Birth (N=4,172) 
Number of Kids -0.681** -0.361 
 (0.306) (0.295) 
 Panel C: Mother's height included in the regression (N=4,314) 
Number of Kids -0.457* -0.244 
  (0.261) (0.275) 
 Panel D: Add in four significant community characteristics (N=4,333) 
Number of Kids -0.605* -0.347 
  (0.318) (0.307) 
 
Child characteristics including gender and age and mother’s educational attainment are included as controls. . Province and year fixed 
effects are also included. A community variable based on the question “Is every couple in your village/neighborhood allowed to have two 
children?” is used as the IV. First stage coefficient for Panel A is statistically significant at 1% level with a value of 0.172 and a standard 
deviation of 0.0539. First stage coefficient for Panel B is statistically significant at 1% level with a value of 0.163 and a standard deviation 
of 0.0492. First stage coefficient for Panel C is statistically significant at 1% level with a value of 0.163 and a standard deviation of 0.0483. 
First stage coefficient for Panel D is statistically significant at 1% level with a value of 0.169 and a standard deviation of 0.0506. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
   
40 
 
 
Table 1.6 Social Economic Status 
VARIABLES z height  z weight 
 Panel A: Income 
 Above Middle Below Middle  Above Middle Below Middle 
Number of Kids -0.428 -0.751***  -0.372 -0.348 
 (0.574) (0.281)  (0.576) (0.377) 
Sample Size 1,953 2,380  1,953 2,380 
 Panel B: Mother's Education 
 Above High School Below High School  Above High School Below High School 
Number of Kids -0.107 -0.749*  -0.297 -0.348 
 (1.502) (0.399)  (0.874) (0.375) 
Sample Size 1,136 3,197  1,136 3,197 
Child characteristics including gender and age and mother’s educational attainment are included as controls. . Province and year fixed effects are 
also included. A community variable based on the question “Is every couple in your village/neighborhood allowed to have two children?” is used 
as the IV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.7 Son Preference 
  z height  z weight 
 Panel A: Children's Gender 
 Boys Girls  Boys Girls 
Number of 
Kids 
-0.408 -0.921***  -0.424 -0.485 
 (0.369) (0.350)  (0.431) (0.323) 
Sample Size 2,356 1,977  2,356 1,977 
 Panel B: Household Income (First is a Girl) 
 
>= Middle 
Class 
< Middle 
Class 
 
>= Middle 
Class 
< Middle 
Class 
Number of 
Kids -0.934 -0.966** 
 
-0.389 0.332 
 (0.746) (0.391)  (1.001) (0.560) 
Sample Size 873 1,104  873 1,104 
 Panel C: Mother's Education (First is a Girl) 
 >= high school < high school  >= high school < high school 
Number of 
Kids 
0.289 -1.368**  -0.0971 -0.634 
 (0.669) (0.668)  (0.403) (0.446) 
Sample Size 518 1,459  518 1,459 
Child characteristics including gender and age and mother’s educational attainment are included as controls. . Province and year fixed 
effects are also included. A community variable based on the question “Is every couple in your village/neighborhood allowed to have two 
children?” is used as the IV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.8 Children's Age 
 Z Height Z weight 
 Children’s Age 
VARIABLES Age < 7 7≤Age<14 14≤Age Age < 7 7≤Age<14 14≤Age 
Number of Kids -0.911*** -0.660* -0.154 -0.395 -0.464 0.120 
 (0.400) (0.342) (0.703) (0.456) (0.387) (0.734) 
       
Sample Size 1,547 1,781 1,005 1,547 1,781 1,005 
Child characteristics including gender and age and mother’s educational attainment are included as controls. . Province and year fixed 
effects are also included. A community variable based on the question “Is every couple in your village/neighborhood allowed to have two 
children?” is used as the IV.  First stage value for each column are: 0.164***, 0.197***, 0.107., Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
 
Table A1.1 One Child Policy Changes over Time  
Policy Rules Announced by Program 
Leader 
Codified in Central Document 
Best is one, at most two; 
eliminate third birth 
June 1978 (LG);  Oct-78 
January 1979 (BP)* 
Best is one Dec-79 Jan-80 
One for all Feb-80 Sep-80 
One child with exceptions 
for rural couples with only a 
daughter** 
Early 1984 (on trial basis);  April 1984(on trial basis) 
May 1988(formal policy) March 1988 (formal policy) 
Note: *LG=Leading Group; BP=birth planning directors (at national meeting) **Known as the daughter –only or 1.5 child policy  
These rules applied to the Han majority; ethnic minorities have enjoyed more lenient policies. 
Source: Greenhalgh (2008) 
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Table A1.2 Twelve Community Characteristics Variables 
No. Variable Description 
1 Population Density Total population of the community divided by community area, 
from official records 
2 Economic Activity Typical daily wage for ordinary male worker (reported by 
community official) and percent of the population engaged in 
nonagricultural work 
3 Traditional Markets Distance to the market (three categories), (1) within the 
boundaries of the community, (2) within the city but not in this 
community, or (3) notwithin the city/village/town); number of 
days of operation for eight different types of market (including 
food and fuel markets) 
4 Modern Markets Number of supermarkets, cafes, internet cafes, indoor 
restaurants, outdoor fixed and mobile eateries, bakeries, ice 
cream parlors, fast food restaurants, fruit and vegetable stands, 
bars within the community boundaries 
5 Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Most common type of road, distance to bus stop, and distance to 
train stop. (Distance is categorized as (1) within community, (2) 
<= 1 km from community, and (3) >= 1 km from community) 
6 Sanitation Proportion of households with treated water and prevalence of 
households without excreta present outside the home 
7 Communications Availability (within community boundaries) of a cinema, 
newspaper, postal service, telephone service; and percent of 
households with a computer, percent of households with a 
television, and percent of households with a cell phone. 
8 Housing Average number of days a week that electricity is available to the 
community, percent of community with indoor tap water, percent 
of community with flush toilets, and percent of community that 
cooks with gas 
9 Education Average education level among adults >21 years old 
10 Diversity Variation in community education level and variation in 
community income level 
11 Health Infrastructure Number and type of health facilities in or nearby (12 km) the 
community and number of pharmacies in community 
12 Social services Provision of preschool for children under 3 years old, availability 
of (offered in community) commercial medical insurance, free 
medical insurance, and/ or insurance for women and children 
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Chapter 2: The Financial Impacts of 
Ambulatory Surgery Centers On General 
Surgical Hospitals 
1. Introduction 
Forty years ago, almost all surgeries were carried out in hospitals (Ambulatory Surgery Center 
Association, 2012). The waiting period for such procedures could be long and recovery times 
could be lengthy. U.S. physicians thus took the lead in transforming the health care industry by 
developing the Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC), a facility that performs surgical procedures 
exclusively on an outpatient basis. ASCs and other ambulatory health care facilities, including 
hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) and physicians' offices, offer alternative sites for 
certain surgical procedures that do not require an overnight stay. ASCs have experienced 
tremendous growth over the last four decades. This paper analyzes the financial impact of 
ASCs on general surgical hospitals. 
The first ASC was established in Phoenix, Arizona in 1970 by two physicians, Wallace 
Reed and John Ford. Their goal was to establish a high-quality, cost effective alternative to 
inpatient surgeries. Throughout the early 1970s, a small number of ASCs opened in the U.S.  
But by 1979, the number of ASCs had already reached triple digits. The year 1982 was marked 
by the approval of payments to ASCs by Medicare, and in 1988 the number of ASCs reached 
a new high: 1,000 nationwide. In 1995, Medicare expanded the list to cover more than 2,000 
ASCs' procedures. In 2011, more than 5,300 ASCs were performing 23 million surgeries on an 
annual basis, and the Medicare program gave approval for ASCs to perform more than 3,500 
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procedures (Ambulatory Surgery Center Association, 2013).1  
The cause of this rampant growth of ASCs is two-folded. From the demand side, 
patients desired health care with lower co-payments, more convenient locations, shorter 
waiting times, and easier scheduling and ASCs satisfied those needs (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, 
& Xanthopoulos, 2009) partially because of the improvement in medical technology that 
allowed for faster patient recovery time and less surgical time.2  Furthermore, Medicare on 
average paid ASCs only 58 percent of what it paid to hospital outpatient departments for 
performing the same service as of 2011 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). For example, 
Medicare paid hospitals $1,670 for performing an outpatient cataract surgery, but paid ASCs 
only $ 964 for performing the same surgery (Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee, 
2015).3 Like the CMS, private insurance companies similarly tend to pay at a lower rate 
(Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee, 2015).4 Therefore, all payers have the 
                                                     
1 For more information about history of ASCs, please visit 
http://www.ascassociation.org/advancingsurgicalcare/whatisanasc/historyofascs. 
2 For example, the latest generation of surgical lasers offers treatments that are faster, safer and less invasive. 
Laser solutions are available across a wide range of surgical fields, from minimally invasive aesthetic surgical 
treatments (laser-assisted lipolysis and hyperhidrosis) to clinical surgical procedures such as endovenous laser 
ablation. See more at: http://www.fotona.com/en/surgery/. Also, minimally invasive techniques are allowing 
patients to recover more quickly from spine surgery. See more at: 
http://www.beckersspine.com/spine/item/20747-how-spine-surgeons-opening-ascs-will-impact-healthcare-
delivery-costs.html.  
3 The use of different inflation measures contributed to this growing divergence in payments between hospitals 
and ASCs. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) uses the hospital market basket, which 
measures the cost of medical expenses, as the inflation rate for hospitals. In contrast, the CMS underestimates 
the inflation rate for ASCs by using the consumer price index-urban, which measures the cost of goods such as 
milk and bread as the inflation rate for ASCs (Ambulatory Surgery Center Advocacy Committee, 2015). ASCs 
can survive with a lower payment rate because they are more efficient (e.g. less perioperative time) (Hair, 
Hussey, & Wynn, 2012; Munnich & Parente, 2014) and as a result cost less to run ("Freestanding ambulatory 
surgery centers cost less to run than in-hospital ORs," 1999; Munnich & Parente, 2014). 
4 Even though the ASCs cost less, their quality of care does not appear to be compromised. Grisel and Arjmand 
(2009) find that ASCs have fewer unexpected safety events than hospital outpatient departments. 
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incentive to encourage their patients to visit ASCs instead of hospitals. 
From the supply side, physicians had been experiencing frustrations, including but not 
limited to scheduling delays, limited operating room availability, slow operating room turnover 
times, and huge resistance from the bureaucracy of hospital administrative systems to buying 
new equipment or adopting new procedures(Ambulatory Surgical Care Associaion, 2011). At 
hospitals, physicians have to comply with the hospital rules and bureaucratic processes. In 
contrast, virtually all physicians have some ownership of ASCs (Ambulatory Surgical Care 
Associaion, 2011). Physicians thus favor ASCs over hospitals because of the professional 
autonomy over their work environment endowed by their ownership of ASCs (Koenig et al., 
2009).  
It is important to look at the growth of ASCs because underlying this growth is a crucial 
economic question: is the revenue and operating expenses of the general acute and surgical 
hospitals affected by the entry of ASCs? The answer to that question has important implications 
for the future surgical care landscape because financial feasibility is an accurate predictor of 
the continuation of the health care business (Gugliotta, 2015).  Even though ASCs only perform 
same-day surgical procedures, the financial situation of hospitals can be affected by their 
entries5 and if the financial impact is negative, then a hospital's existence may be threatened.6  
Also, changes in the surgical care landscape have a direct impact on patients' welfare.  
If ASCs drive some hospitals out of business, then the same day surgical market will become 
                                                     
5 One possible scenario is that ASCs may attract hospital outpatients for the overlapped procedures. 
6 In Ohio, hospitals have already closed because of the competition from ambulatory care facilities. Hospitals 
are operating with few beds or closing all together to make way for new ambulatory care centers. In Lakewood, 
Ohio, the only hospital in the city has closed because its 200 beds were typically half empty (Evans, 2015). 
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increasingly dominated by ASCs. A less competitive health care market definitely will change 
the quality and cost of care, for better or for worse.7 Therefore, a negative financial impact of 
ASCs on hospitals could greatly affect the surgical care market. Consequently, confirming the 
very existence of such negative financial impacts becomes a critical first step to investigate the 
market dynamics between ASCs and general surgical care hospitals. 
I find that ASCs do have a negative financial impact on surgical hospitals in 
Pennsylvania. To reach this conclusion, I apply a two-stage least square model (2SLS) with 
hospital fixed-effects, time fixed-effects, and a hospital specific time trend; my instrumental 
variable is the product of change in over-65 population at the county level over the years studied 
and change in average Medicare payments rate for all ASCs' procedures over the same years. 
My main data sources are: the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) 
inpatient and hospital financial data base, the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual 
surveys dataset, ASCs' survey dataset from the Division of Health Information in the PA 
Department of Health, and the Medicare payment rate for all ASCs' procedures from the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).  
I find that one more ASC in the region increases net patient revenue by an average of 
6.81 percent at the hospital level and increases total operating costs by an average of 8.76 
percent, resulting in a decrease in profit margin at the hospital level.  Such a financial change 
likely is caused by increases in the severity of inpatients' conditions treated at hospitals when 
ASCs enter the same market. My results show that this change in severity composition is not 
                                                     
7 There is evidence for and against provider competition. Some papers find that competition can improve health 
care outcomes and control health care costs while others find that provider competition has resulted in poor 
outcomes, duplicate costs, and inefficient allocation of resources (Penelope \& Meredith, 2010). 
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caused by ASCs transferring more of their sicker patients to ASCs. More likely, it is a negative 
spillover effect from induced demand, in that more severely ill patients go to hospitals 
voluntarily for their surgeries once they get to know the benefits of these surgeries through 
ASCs' advertisements or they are referred to the hospitals by their physicians before they 
receive any treatments at ASCs. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on the financial impact of ASC on hospitals is scarce. The first study of their 
financial impact on hospitals was done by Carey, Burgess, and Young (2011). They estimate a 
hospital fixed effects model using data from Arizona, California, and Texas with a hospital 
fixed-effect model and find that ASCs tend to pull down revenues, costs, and profits in general 
hospitals. Their paper is groundbreaking, but it involves an unsolved endogeneity problem: the 
entry choice of individual ASCs may be driven by some co-founding unobservable factors. For 
example, if some unobserved factors that drive ASCs to establish in the area are also correlated 
with hospital financial performance, then the causality between ASCs' penetration rate in the 
market and general surgical hospital performance cannot be established.  The authors argue 
that they can alleviate the endogeneity concern by using hospital fixed-effects.  However, their 
hospital fixed-effects model can only capture unobserved time invariant factors that exist at the 
hospital level. Causality is still jeopardized if other omitted factors are correlated with both the 
dependent variable (i.e. hospital revenue and costs) and the independent variables (i.e. number 
of ASCs in a region). For instance, hospital fixed-effects can neither capture the community-
level characteristics (e.g. community socioeconomic status) nor hospital-level time varying 
factors (e.g. changes in hospital management teams), that are correlated with the penetration of 
ASCs and hospital financial performances.  
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My first contribution to the literature is to apply the 2SLS model and address the 
endogeneity problem. I exploit the variation in the growth of the over-65 population at the 
county level and the average Medicare payments rate for all ASCs' procedures at national level 
by year in order to create a unique instrumental variable.  To my knowledge, this paper is the 
first to address the endogeneity problem in this research topic.  
My second contribution to the literature builds upon Carey, Burgess, and Young to 
explore the possible channels that might cause revenue and cost changes in hospitals when 
ASCs enter the region. Hospital managers have their own interpretation of how their financial 
situation changes upon the entry of ASCs: they believe that their financial situation worsens 
because ASCs have taken the lucrative patients (e.g. Medicare and privately insured patients) 
and left hospitals with the indigent patients (e.g. Medicaid patients). They also accuse ASCs of 
taking the healthier patients (Hylton, 2006) and their allegations are not groundless.  Strope et 
al. (2009) find that patients with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to have 
procedures performed in ASCs. Additionally, there is evidence that ASCs not only attract 
affluent patients, but also select profitable procedures (Plotzke & Courtemanche, 2011). In fact, 
physician-owners of ASCs might be steering the ASCs toward profit-seeking behaviors, 
including but not limited to selecting patients and profitable procedures (Hollingsworth; et al., 
2010; Seth A. Strope et al., 2009). 
These studies suggest indirect causes for the negative impacts of ASCs on hospitals 
because these studies focus on the ASCs. Profit seeking behaviors in ASCs and hospitals are 
not mutually exclusive because both of them can carry out profit-seeking strategies. So just 
because ASCs are selecting patients, it does not necessarily mean hospitals are accepting poor, 
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severely ill patients. In order to identify the possible direct causes of changing hospital 
profitability, we need to focus on hospital data and use it to ask whether there is any change on 
the hospital side upon ASCs' entry by controlling for other important co-factors and addressing 
the endogeneity problem. 
3. Data 
Hospital financial performance information--including hospital net patient revenue, total 
operating costs, and payer ratio of the net patient revenue--is from PHC4 Financial Analysis 
Volume One--General Acute Care Hospitals. I use the payer ratio times the net patient revenue 
to get the total insurance payment by payer types. Data on hospital characteristics are from the 
AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals. They include hospital names and locations, number of beds, 
number of total surgical operations8 and number of inpatient surgical operations.  
The Division of Health Information in the PA Department of Health has ASCs' survey 
data from 1996 to 2014. Those annual datasets include information such as facility names and 
locations, number of surgeries performed, number of beds, hospital referral region (HRR) 
number, and more. The HRR regions are defined by determining where patients were referred 
for major cardiovascular surgical procedures and for neurosurgery (“Data by Region ”, 2015). 
They are widely used to define health care markets.9 Following Carey et al. (2011), I use the 
                                                     
8 Total surgeries include inpatient and outpatient surgeries. 
9 Carey et al. (2011) define the hospital market by HRR and calculate the ASCs' penetration rate as the number 
of ASCs per HRR; Cutler and Scott Morton (2013) define the market by HRR to study hospital market share 
and consolidations; Chandra, Finkelstein, Sacarny, and Syverson (2013) use HRR market definition to explore 
procedures including emergent conditions and hip and knee replacements. 
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number of ASCs in each HRR region as the measurement of ASCs' penetration rate. 10 11 In 
total, there are 15 HRRs in my sample. 
Since the CMS revised the ASC payment system in 2008, observations after 2007 were 
excluded to avoid the potential co-founding effects.  The ASC final rules provide for a four-
year transition period for implementation of the rates calculated by using the methodology of 
the revised ASC payment system. In each year after 2008, there are multiple payments for the 
same procedures at different times because of the shock of implementing new rules. The 
payment system change essentially is about implementing a value-based purchasing (VBP) 
program for payments under the Medicare program for ASCs. The VBP also was applied to 
general acute hospitals in fiscal year 2013. Prior to the official launch of VBP to general 
hospitals, the Medicare program gradually had been moving toward its implementation starting 
with a pay-for-reporting program in July 2007 (e.g., the Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting 
program and the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative) in general acute hospitals (Cheryl L. 
Damberg et al., 2014). All of those policies would have a direct impact on hospital financial 
situations since CMS always uses the payment rate as the incentive to enforce the policies 
(United States Government Accountability Office, 2015). 
In addition, I cannot study time periods before 2001 because CMS only maintains a 
                                                     
10 Hospital service area (HSA) is not appropriate for defining the markets in my paper for two reasons: 1. 
Patients who live outside of a particular HSA region but are referred to the hospital located in the HSA area will 
not be counted as part of the healthcare market. 2. HSA region is too small to capture the whole market of a 
hospital. The average number of ASCs in each HSA is 4.44 and the average number of ASCs in the market 
defined by the circle drawn around a hospital from which it attracts 65 percent of inpatients is 7.83. 
11 Variable radius approach is not used because of lack of outpatient data. Variable radius is defined by the circle 
around the hospital from which it attracts a certain percentage of all patients (Gresenz et al., 2004). Without 
outpatient data, the total patient population cannot be defined. 
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payment record for all ASCs' procedures starting from 2001. Because I am using the percentage 
change between consecutive years to calculate the IV, 2001 data would be missing. Effectively, 
I am studying the data from 2002 to 2007. 
Hospital level data and ASC data are merged by HRR number and year. Initially, there 
were 275 unique hospitals in Pennsylvania in the AHA dataset from 2002 to 2007. After 
limiting the study to only acute care and general surgical hospitals, I have 166 unique hospitals 
left, over 6 years, with 899 observations in total at the hospital-year level. 
The number of ASCs per HRR is the key explanatory variable which I use to measure 
the ASCs penetration rate. In Pennsylvania, the number of ASCs more than doubled from 102 
in 2002 to 217 in 2007 (Figure 2.1). In Figures 2.2 and 2.3, I show that only three counties had 
more than three ASCs in 2002 but in 2007, thirteen counties had more than six ASCs, with the 
highest number of ASCs per county topping out at 22. The ASCs were highly concentrated 
around urban and suburban areas (e.g. Philadelphia, Harrisburg, Pittsburgh, and so on) in 2002, 
but by 2007, the ASCs had spread to a lot of other counties as well. 
When I explore the possible mechanisms, I need to use inpatient characteristics as the 
dependent variables. I use the hospital name to link each inpatient record in the PHC4 with 
hospital level data. Data on inpatient characteristic--such as their age, race, gender, admission 
source (e.g. transferred from ASCs), insurance type, diagnosis and procedure codes, zip code 
of residence, drug charge, ancillary charge,12 and total inpatient charges excluding professional 
                                                     
12 Ancillary charges are charges for services that may include laboratory tests, supplies, medications, physical 
therapy, x-rays, operating room charges, and others. 
54 
 
fees per admission13--are from the PHC4 inpatient data base. I aggregate the data by hospital 
and year to get the mean value of all inpatient variables at the hospital-year level. 
4. Empirical Model 
The impact of ASCs on hospital financial outcomes can be expressed as  
Yikt = 𝛼0 + α1𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑘𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝛼3  + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑡                                                                  (1) 
where Yikt is the financial measurement of total patient revenue or total operating expense in 
log values for hospital 𝑖 in HRR 𝑘 in year 𝑡. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑘𝑡is the total number of ASCs in HRR 𝑘 
in year 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖𝑡 represents other hospital characteristics for hospital 𝑖 in year 𝑡, including a bed 
size categorical variable, teaching status, ownership status,14 and a hospital-specific time trend. 
Hospital bed size is divided into four groups: below 100, 100-299, 300-499, 500 and more. 𝜂𝑖 is 
the hospital fixed-effects and 𝜏𝑡 is the time fixed-effects. 
The variation of the dependent variables in the data comes from two sources: inter-
hospital (across hospital) variation and intra-hospital (within hospital) variation. Regressions 
that rely on inter-hospital variation are problematic because of omitted variable bias (e.g. 
endogenous hospital characteristics, such as management team competency, can make a huge 
difference in hospitals' financial performance). The solution is to focus on intra-hospital 
variations only by including the hospital fixed-effects  𝜂𝑖 .  In addition, time fixed-effects 
𝜏𝑡 help us remove the time variant unobserved factors that are common to all hospitals. As 
                                                     
13 Total inpatient charges excluding professional fees include total room and board charges, total ancillary 
charges, total drug charges, total equipment charges and total of other charges. 
14 Hospital teaching status and ownership status do change over time. For example, Sacred Heart Hospital in 
Allentown, Pennsylvania changed to a teaching hospital in 2006 and Altoona Hospital in Altoona, Pennsylvania 
changed from not-for-profit to for-profit in 2007. Hundreds of hospitals have switched from being nonprofit to 
for-profit over the past decade in U.S. (Joynt, Orav, & Jha, 2014). Therefore, it is necessary to include dummies 
for teaching status and non-for-profit status together with the hospital fixed-effects. 
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shown in Figure 2.5, there is a clear common trend, and hence the time fixed-effects become 
necessary.   
I include a linear hospital trend as my main result but in the robustness checks I also 
test hospital quadratic trends to prove that the form of the hospital trend does not affect my 
results. Net patient revenue, total operating expenses, insurance payments and number of 
surgeries (total or inpatient)15 16 are highly skewed (Figure 2.4).17 Therefore, I use the log 
transformation. Summary Statistics are shown in Table 2.1. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from the model described above are biased 
because the number of ASCs can be influenced by certain cofactors that also affect hospital 
financial performance. Thus after controlling for hospital and time fixed-effects and a hospital 
specific time trend, which can partially alleviate the endogeneity concern, we still need to 
address the endogeneity caused by omitted variables. None of the previous literature has 
addressed this important issue. 
To address the endogeneity problem I use a 2SLS model with the product of change in 
over-65 population at the county level over the years studied and change in average Medicare 
payments18 rate for all ASCs' procedures over the same years as my IV. The IV in 2002 is 
                                                     
15 Inpatient charges and Charlson index are computed based on the 17 selected CCS coded procedures only. 
More details are discussed in section 7. 
16 None of those variables have zero values. 
17 Only net patient revenue and total operating expenses graphs are shown as examples. Graphs of other 
variables are available upon request. 
18 County-level population data are intercensal estimates from the United States Census and county elder 
population change is exogenous to unobservable variables like hospital management teams.  The Medicare 
payment rate for ASCs' procedures comes from archived data dating back to 2001 maintained by the CMS and 
varies by procedures and years. The standard ASC payment for most covered surgical procedures is calculated 
by multiplying the ASC conversion factor by the ASC relative payment weight for each separately payable 
procedure. The ASC conversion factor (CF) is adjusted for the purpose of budget neutrality by removing the 
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calculated by multiplying the change in population aged 65 and above between 2001 and 2002 
and the change in the average Medicare payment across all ASC procedures from 2001 to 2002.  
The average Medicare payment rate over all ASC procedures by year is calculated at a national 
level and exogenous to any neighborhood characteristics or hospital characteristics. The 
downside of using the average national payment rate change is that the average payment rate 
only varies by year; there is no geographical variation. The change in population aged 65 and 
above over the years at county level is an ideal variable because it varies by region. Together 
these two factors determine a significant portion of the payment that health care suppliers 
receive and hence determine the number of ASCs in the region. I provide more evidence to 
support the exogeneity of my instrumental variables in Section 5. 
5. Results 
Table 2.2 displays the main results. Panel A shows the OLS results using hospital and year 
fixed-effects, without hospital time trend. It shows that with one more ASC in the region, net 
patient revenue decreases by 1.24 percent and total operating expenses decrease by 1.26 percent.  
This implies that the presence of ASCs reduces hospital's revenues and that hospital responded 
by lowering their operating costs in order to maintain their profitability. This result is similar 
to the findings of Carey et al. (2011). 
After the linear hospital trend is added, the empirical results no longer support the 
conclusion above. As shown in Panel B, one more ASC in the HRR has no significant effects 
                                                     
effects of changes in wage index values for the upcoming year as compared to values for the current year 
(Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2014).ASC CF and  relative payment weight are exogenous to 
unobserved characteristics such as neighborhood socioeconomic status or changes in management teams; hence 
the Medicare payment rate change for ASCs' procedures also should be exogenous. Therefore, my IV should be 
exogenous. 
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on revenues but increases hospital operating costs by 1.86 percent. It is thus critical to include 
a hospital linear time trend in the model, because unobserved hospital characteristics which 
vary over time have a significant negative impact on hospital revenues and operating expenses. 
Therefore, all of the regression specifications described next must include a linear hospital 
trend.  
Column 2 and 3 of Panel C in Table 2.2 present second stage results of 2SLS with 
hospital fixed-effects, year fixed-effects and a linear hospital trend. The first stage result of my 
2SLS estimation is shown in column 1 of Panel C, Table 2.2: it is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level with a t-value of 3.25 and an F-value of 10.59.19 This shows that my IV is strong 
enough: the positive sign of the coefficient estimate implies that more elders and increases in 
the Medicare payment will attract more physicians to set up ASCs in the HRR region because 
of potential financial profitability. According to the second stage results, one more ASC in the 
HRR will increase net patient revenue at hospitals in the HRR region by 6.81 percent and 
increase their total operating costs by 8.76 percent. Both results are significant at the 1 percent 
level. Therefore, the revenue increases are not sufficient to cover the cost increases, which 
results in a decrease in the profit margin.  
The increase in the coefficient scale after applying the IV implies that the correlation 
between the omitted variables and the number of ASCs is negative because the estimate bias is 
negative.  There could be many potential unobservable. One example may be elders' 
preferences: elders might prefer to visit the outpatient department of general surgical hospitals 
because there they could be treated faster should any complications arise --- the elderly face a 
                                                     
19 Both t and F value are rounded to the nearest tenth. 
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higher probability of complications as a group because of the presence of comorbidity (Byers, 
Yaffe, Covinsky, Friedman, & Bruce, 2010) .  If elders prefer to visit hospitals over ASCs, then 
their preference would be negatively correlated with the number of ASCs in the region. 
Consequently, omitting such preferences would create a negative bias. 
The effectiveness of my 2SLS strategy depends on the exogeneity of the IV. 
Empirically, there is no way to prove that an IV is exogenous with respect to the unobservable 
factors. But if the IV is exogenous to observable characteristics, then it is also very likely 
exogenous to unobservable characteristics.  Table 2-3 shows the results of testing the 
correlation between IV and observable hospital characteristics and Table 2-4 shows the results 
of testing the correlation between IV and inpatient characteristics.20 The regressions use the 
same specifications as Equation 1, including hospital fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and a 
linear hospital trend. As shown in Tables 2-3 and 2-4, the IV is not correlated with any of the 
observable hospital and inpatient characteristics. This proves that my IV is exogenous to 
hospital and inpatient observable characteristics and implies that my IV likely is also 
exogenous to potential unobservable factors.  
6. Robustness Checks 
I perform robustness checks in four ways: first and foremost, instead of using the number of 
ASCs, I use the total number of surgeries in each HRR region as the measurement the ASC 
penetration rate to prove that different measurements of the penetration rate would not affect 
my results. The results are in Panel A. Panel A has a much smaller coefficient due to the fact 
                                                     
20 Due to the difference in operating procedures between ASCs and hospital inpatient departments, I only focus 
on the overlapped procedures between ASCs and hospital inpatient departments when I test the correlation 
between inpatient characteristics and IV. More details are discussed in section 7. 
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that the number of ASC surgeries per HRR is very large.21 
Second, I add average inpatient characteristics at the hospital level including race, 
gender, and age for hospital 𝑖 in year 𝑡 to see whether my model, without any inpatient 
characteristics, has successfully captured the effect of inpatient characteristics. I divide age into 
six groups: 0-19, 20-34, 34-49, 50-64, and 65 and above. Race is characterized as Black, White, 
Asian, and others. All of the patient data are aggregated to the hospital level. The coefficients 
in Panel B are very similar to the main results. That similarity shows that adding patient 
characteristics does not change the results significantly. This suggests that the change in patient 
severity is captured well by hospital fixed-effects, time fixed-effects and a linear hospital trend.  
Third, as shown in the summary statistics, because the majority of ASCs are for-profit, 
I shall determine whether the results still hold when I drop all of the not-for-profit ASCs. If the 
results remain similar, then the for-profit ASCs are the key players affecting hospital financial 
performance. Results are shown in Panel C and indeed, they are very similar to the main result, 
suggesting that for-profit ASCs are the major force that impact hospitals' business.  
Last but not the least, a quadratic hospital trend replaces the linear hospital trend to test 
whether my results are affected by different trend specifications.  Panel D results demonstrate 
that different specifications of hospital trends have no effect on the main results. In the first 
three panels of the robustness check, the regressions include hospital fixed-effects, year fixed-
effects and a linear hospital trend. The last panel replaces the linear hospital trend with a 
quadratic one. Across all four panels, the first stage estimates are all significant. The increase 
in total operating expense is larger than the increase in net patient revenue upon ASC entry, 
                                                     
21 On average, there are approximately 20 ASCs in each HRR but around 70,000 surgeries. 
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implying a decrease in the profit margin.  
7. Mechanisms 
Next, I explore the possible mechanism by which could cause the hospital finances change 
when ASCs enter the market. I replace Yikt in Equation 1 with the log value of net patient 
revenue by payer type22 and the number of total surgeries for all procedures. As shown in Table 
2-6, Medicare and private payments increase by 5.09 percent and 7.31 percent on average, 
respectively, with one more ASC. Medicaid payments are not affected by ASC entry. These 
payment increases can explain why net patient revenue would increase when ASCs enter the 
market.  
We can gain additional insights by looking at the change in the mix of inpatients 
following ASCs' entry. Due to the difference in operating procedures between ASCs and 
hospital inpatient departments,23 I only focus on the overlapping procedures between ASCs 
and hospitals' inpatient departments. I first select the 25 most common ASC procedures24 
according to the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services website. Those 25 procedures are 
marked by Current Procedural Terminology (CPT®) codes and are selected based on surgical 
volume in 2012.25 26  Inpatient procedures are classified by International Classification of 
Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM). Using single-level clinical 
                                                     
22 Insurance payment by payer type is calculated by multiplying the net patient revenue and payer payment ratio 
of net patient revenue. 
23 ASCs generally operate surgeries that do not require an overnight stay, whereas hospitals' inpatient 
departments provide extended support to surgeries that require more than a 24 hour stay. 
24 Procedure details can be found at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Research/HealthCareConInit/ASC.html 
25 Most common procedures in the years prior to 2012 are not available in CMS website. 
26 CPT is a proprietary coding system developed by the American Medical Association (AMA) for coding 
services provided by health care professionals. 
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classification software (CCS) from the Health Care Utilization Project (HCUP), we can classify 
both ICD-9-CM and CPT codes for 244 different procedure types. After classifying the 25 
common ASC procedures and the ICD-9-CM into CCS codes, I select those common 
procedures with the same CCS code in inpatient and ASC settings. There are 17 CCS coded 
procedures in the end (Appendix).  
I replace Yikt with the log value of ancillary charges, drug charges, Charlson index, 
number of inpatient surgeries, and number of total inpatient admissions at the hospital-year 
level. I also replace Yikt with a dummy variable indicating whether the admission source is 
from ASCs to investigate whether ASCs transfer patients to inpatient departments. Table 2-7 
presents the results. 
Because I focus only on patients who were treated under the 17 CCS categorical 
procedures, the average payment rate is calculated only over the 17 CCS coded procedures. 
Hence the IV should have a different value and consequently the first stage result will be 
different. Column 1 shows the first stage results: the coefficient of the IV is significant at the 
1 percent level with an F statistic approximately equals to 12.1.  
From column 2, we can tell that for the 17 selected categorical procedures, one more 
ASC in the HRR would not significantly change the number of patients transferred from ASCs 
to hospitals. This implies that ASCs do not transfer severe patients to hospitals' inpatient 
departments after treating them. However, it may be that ASCs refer the more seriously ill 
patients directly to hospitals without treating them, and such referrals would not be reflected in 
the admission source of hospitals.  
The results in columns 3 and 4 show that the total number of inpatient surgeries and the 
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total number of hospital inpatient admissions at the hospital-year level are not affected when 
ASCs enter the HRR market. This finding is consistent with Courtemanche and Plotzke (2010), 
who demonstrate that ASCs exert very little downward pressure on hospital surgical volume: 
the average reduction is only 2 - 4 percent if the ASC is close enough. And, they find no 
evidence that ASCs reduce inpatient volume. This implies that induced demand is created by 
ASCs possibly through promoting the benefits of surgeries with multiple channels including 
TV and mail advertisements. 
So, why does hospital cost increase when ASCs enter the same HRR market? The 
Charlson index coefficient in column 5 indicates that hospital patients' severity increases with 
ASCs' presence. It is possible that ASCs are attracting affluent, less severely ill patients away 
from hospitals ( S. A. Strope et al. (2009) indicate that patients of higher socioeconomic status 
are more likely to have procedures performed in ASCs).  At the same time, the more severely 
ill patients may make an informed decision and go to the hospital voluntarily after seeing the 
advertisements from ASCs about the benefits of surgeries. Or, the severely ill patients may be 
referred by physicians to go to hospitals instead of ASCs before they are treated at ASCs. The 
bottom line is that if there is any sorting process, it happens before the patients are accepted at 
ASCs. 
This suspicion is supported by the results shown in column 6 and 7: ancillary charges 
and drug charges increase by 4.85 percent and 9.35 percent respectively with one more ASC 
in the HRR. Those two variables measure treatment intensity and show that inpatient treatment 
intensity increases with ASCs' entry. This increase in treatment intensity could be caused by 
two possibilities. One possibility is that hospitals increase treatment intensity in order to 
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compete with ASC. For example, hospital might buy a larger, new CT scanner to satisfy and 
attract obese patients, for example. The other possibility is that the cost of treatment increases 
with more severely ill patients. Because ASC entry is associated with the increases in the 
Charlson index at hospitals, the latter possibility is more likely. With more severely ill patients, 
hospitals' revenue would increase but their operating expense would increase even more. My 
finding is supported by Meyerhoefer, Colby and  McFetridge (2012). They also find that ASCs 
benefit from the positive patient selection by using the data in Florida from 2004-2008. 
8. Conclusion 
With  advances in medical technology that allow for more procedures to be done on an 
outpatient basis and incentives for containing health care costs, ASCs are becoming a key 
player in the health care sector. This paper contributes to an understanding of how market entry 
by ASCs affects hospitals' overall financial performance.  My key contribution is to use an 
instrumental variable, the product of change in the county Medicare population and change in 
the average Medicare payment rate for all ASCs' procedures, to address the endogeneity of the 
number of ASCs in a hospital market. I also highlight the importance of including a hospital 
trend in the analysis. My results suggest that the emergence of ASCs actually increases both 
net patient revenue and operating costs for hospitals. Although their revenue rise, hospitals 
seem to be treating more severely ill patients with more intensive treatments that drive up 
operating costs, resulting in a decrease in profit margin. 
My results suggest that ASCs are not dumping more severely ill patients to hospitals 
after they have been admitted to ASCs. Rather, it appears that the patient sorting process is 
complete before patients are admitted into ASCs. More severe patients do tend to end up at 
hospitals when ASCs enter the market, but the exact cause of this is not clear. There are at least 
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two possibilities: more seriously ill patients are referred by physicians to hospitals without any 
treatment at ASCs, or these patients go to the hospitals on their own once they get to know the 
benefits of the surgeries, perhaps due to ASCs' advertising. Sicker patients may prefer to go to 
hospitals for surgeries if they think they may be treated faster should any complications arise. 
Physicians who own ASCs and have hospital admitting privileges may refer the sicker patients 
to hospitals, and the incentive for a referral does not have to be monetary. The sicker patients 
need more intensive care from hospitals; ASCs do not have the capability to treat patients with 
severe complications. In sum, the compositions change of inpatients upon ASCs' entry maybe 
more a negative spillover effect of induced surgical demand than anything else.  
Future research could include a more comprehensive study, by utilizing hospital 
outpatient data together with inpatient data and defining the hospital market more accurately 
by applying the variable radius approach.  Also, my conclusion about the mechanism that 
causes the financial situation change in hospitals when ASCs enter the HRR market is only 
suggestive. Future research could try to definitively identify the cause. 
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Figure 2.1 Numbers of ASCs in Pennsylvania 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Numbers of ASCs by County in 2002 
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Figure 2.3 Numbers of ASCs by County in 2007 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Distributions of Financial Measurements 
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Figure 2.5 Median of the Log Value of Financial Measurements
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
Variables             Mean Standard Deviation 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Log of Net Patient Revenue  11.34 1.064 
Log of Total Operating Costs 11.367 1.045 
Log of Medicare Payment 10.421 1.084 
Log of Medicaid Payment 8.505 1.264 
Log of Private Payment 10.45 1.143 
Log of Total Number of Surgeries 8.744 0.928 
Log of Total Inpatient Charge Per Patient 9.758 0.681 
Log of Ancillary Charges 8.888 0.071 
Log of Drug Charges 7.844 0.754 
Log of Charlson Index -0.214 0.307 
Log of Inpatient admissions 5.382 1.189 
Log of Inpatient Surgeries 7.537 1.181 
Transferred from ASCs to Hospitals*      3.05 × 10−6                                    10−4 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
Hospital Bed Size Category 2 : 100-299 0.552 0.496 
Hospital Bed Size Category 3 : 300-499 0.155 0.363 
Hospital Bed Size Category 4 : 500 and more 0.078 0.268 
Hospital Not-for-profit Status 0.925 0.263 
Teaching Hospital 0.207 0.405 
Male 0.422 0.052 
Age Group 2 : 20 -34 0.116 0.054 
Age Group 3 : 35-49 0.15 0.043 
Age Group 4 : 50-64 0.191 0.04 
Age Group 5 : 65 and above 0.489 0.115 
Race_Black 0.079 0.13 
Race_Asian 0.004 0.006 
Race_White 0.88 0.164 
Panel C: Instrumental Variables 
Number of ASCs in each HRR 20.634 16.637 
Number of ASCs Surgeries in each HRR 69779.81 55818.53 
Number of For-Profit ASCs in each HRR 18.081  14.347 
Net patient revenue, total operating expense, Medicare payment, Medicaid payment, private payment are all measured in thousands at 
hospital level. Medicare payment, Medicaid payment and private payments are calculated by multiplying total net patient revenue and 
payment ratio of net patient revenue for different insures respectively. Number of observations is 899.        
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Table 2.2 Financial Impacts of ASCs on Surgical Hospitals 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  First Stage Log of Net Patient Revenue Log of Total Operating Expense 
 Number of ASCs OLS OLS 
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares without Hospital Linear Trend 
Number of ASCs -0.0124*** -0.0126*** 
  -0.00271 -0.00255 
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares with Hospital Linear Trend 
Number of ASCs 0.0166 0.0186* 
  -0.011 -0.0101 
Panel C: Two Stage  Least Squares with Hospital Linear Trend 
Number of ASCs 0.0681*** 0.0876*** 
  -0.0252 -0.0259 
IV 247.4***   
  -76.01     
Net patient revenues and total operating expense (in thousands) are in log values. Bed-size categories, teaching status, ownership status, 
hospital fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are included. Instrumental variable is defined as the product of change of population aged 65 or 
above (measured by thousands) at county level and the change in average Medicare payment rates for all ASCs' procedures. Number of 
observations is 899. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at HRR level.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Exogeneity Test of Instrumental Variables (Hospital Characteristics) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIA
BLES 
Hospital Bed 
Size Group 1 
Hospital Bed 
Size Group 2 
Hospital Bed 
Size Group 3 
Hospital Bed 
Size Group 4 Not-For-
Profit 
Teaching 
Hospital (<100)  (100-299)  (300-499)  (500 and more) 
IV 2.573 0.866 -3.643 0.205 -0.536 -2.325 
  -3.104 -4.382 -2.497 -3.192 -1.162 -6.555 
Bed size in hospital is divided into 4 groups: below 100, 100-299, 300-499, 500 or more. Hospital fixed-effects, year fixed-effects and a 
linear hospital trend are included. Number of observations is 899. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at 
HRR level. Instrumental variable is defined as the product of change of population aged 65 or above (measured by thousands) at county 
level and the change in average Medicare payment rates for all ASCs' procedures.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 2.5 Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  First Stage Net Patient Revenue Total Operating Expense 
 Number of ASCs/Surgeries 2SLS 2SLS 
Panel A: Use Number of Surgeries in Each HRR as ASCs Penetration Measurement 
Number of Surgeries 1.72e-05*** 2.21e-05*** 
  -5.66E-06 -5.58E-06 
IV 978,919***   
  -297,590     
Panel B: 2SLS with Added Inpatient Characteristics 
Number of ASCs 0.0676** 0.0868*** 
  -0.028 -0.0284 
IV 250.0***   
  -74.22     
Panel C: 2SLS with Number of For-Profit ASCs only 
Number of ASCs 0.0639* 0.0821** 
  -0.0371 -0.0416 
IV 263.7**   
  -102.6     
Panel D: 2SLS with hospital quadratic trend 
Number of ASCs 0.0690*** 0.0983*** 
  -0.0243 -0.0285 
IV 238.5***   
  -73.26     
Net patient revenues and total operating expense ( in thousands) are in log values. Bed-size categories, teaching status, ownership status, 
hospital fixed-effects, year fixed-effects and a linear hospital trend are included for Panel A, Panel B and Panel C. The linear hospital trend 
is replaced with a quadratic trend in Panel D. Number of observations is 899. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered at HRR level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 2.6 Overall Mechanisms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Variables 
First 
Stage 
Medicare Payments Medicaid Payments Private Insurance Payments  
Number of ASCs 0.0509* 0.0232 0.0731***  
  -0.0295 -0.0222 -0.0218  
IV 247.4***     
  -76.01        
Bed-size categories, teaching status, ownership status, hospital fixed-effects, year fixed-effects and a linear hospital trend are included.  
Medicare payment, Medicaid payment, and private payment (in thousands) are all measured in log value at hospital level. Payments are 
calculated by multiplying total net patient revenue and payment ratio of net patient revenue for different insures respectively. Instrumental 
variable is defined as the product of change of population aged 65 or above (measured by thousands) at county level and the change in 
average Medicare payment rates for all ASCs' procedures. Number of observations is 899. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at HRR level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Appendix Tables 
Table A2.1 CCS code and Procedure Names 
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Chapter 3: The Persistence of the Effectiveness 
of the Hospital Readmission Program in 
Reducing Hospital Readmissions 
1. Introduction 
 
Hospital readmission costs a lot of manpower and resources. According to a statistical brief 
from AHRQ  (Anika L. Hines, Marguerite L. Barrett, H. Joanna Jiang, & Claudia A. Steiner, 
2014), there were approximately 3.3 million readmissions in the United States across all payers 
in Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older and individuals aged 18 –64 years who were 
privately insured, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid in 2011. Readmissions add $41.3 billion 
(Anika L. Hines et al., 2014) in total hospital costs.  And among those readmissions, Medicare 
has the largest share (55.9 percent) and Medicaid has the second largest share (20.6 percent). 
Similarly, Jencks , Williams , and Coleman (2009) estimate that the cost to Medicare of 
unplanned readmission in 2004 was $ 17.4 billion. 
In order to reduce readmissions, Section 3025 of the Affordable Care Act added section 
1886(q) to the Social Security Act establishing the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
(HRRP), which requires Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to reduce payments 
to inpatient perspective payment system (IPPS) hospitals1 with excess readmissions, effective 
for discharges beginning on October 1, 2012.  
The leverage that CMS uses to force hospitals to try to reduce readmissions is a penalty. 
                                                     
1 Section 1886(d) of the Social Security Act (the Act) sets forth a system of payment for the operating costs 
of acute care hospital inpatient stays under Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) based on prospectively 
set rates. This payment system is referred to as the inpatient prospective payment system 
(IPPS). (https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/index.html?redirect=/acuteinpatientpps/). The acute care hospital that stays 
under Medicare Part A plan are referred as the IPPS hospitals.  
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CMS publishes a readmissions adjustment factor for each IPPS hospital to indicate the weight 
of its penalty, which ranges from 0.9700 (reflecting the maximum 3% penalty for FY 2015) to 
1.00 (indicating no penalty) (Hoffman, 2015). However, CMS does not publish an estimated 
final penalty for individual hospitals.  
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the HRRP program at a quarterly basis by 
focusing on acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and heart failure (HF) patients. By using a 
difference in differences method, I find that HRRP has not been effective at reducing 
readmissions three quarters after the program was implemented.   
2. Literature Review 
 
Papers which discuss the HRRP are still scarce, let alone ones which assess the effectiveness 
of the HRRP. According to James (2013), CMS reported to Congress in February 2013 that the 
all-cause Medicare readmission rate had dropped to 17.8 percent in the last quarter of 2012, 
down from the historic level of 19 percent. However, whether such a decrease is caused by the 
HRRP is unknown.  Berenson , Paulus , and Kalman (2012) pointed out that implementing a 
new system or revising a current system to reduce readmission itself is costly for each hospital 
and if that cost is greater than the penalty from CMS for high readmission rates, there is no 
financial incentive for hospitals to reduce their readmission rate. They also point out that there 
can be a decrease in revenue from readmission reduction. Their paper does not address the 
effectiveness of the HRRP program empirically. 
 Zuckerman, Sheingold, Orav, Ruhter, and Epstein (2016) find that HRRP is effective in 
reducing the readmissions within one month of discharge among Medicare elderly beneficiaries. 
Carey and Lin (2015) find similar conclusions by focusing on the New York hospitals.   
There are many papers studying the effectiveness of one or more approaches to 
reducing the readmission rate for one group of patients with a specific diagnosis or insurance 
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(e.g Medicare).2 Cloonan, Wood, and Riley (2013) summarize the suggestions based on current 
literature and suggest that enhancing patient-centered discharge processes, focusing on 
medication reconciliation, improving coordination with community-based providers, and 
effective patient self-management of their disease and treatment could reduce readmissions.  
Hansen, Young, Hinami, Leung, and Williams (2011) studied three kinds of interventions 
which are used to decrease readmissions: predischarge interventions including patient 
education, medication reconciliation, discharge planning, and scheduling of a follow-up 
appointment before discharge; postdischarge interventions including follow-up telephone calls, 
patient-activated hotlines, timely communication with ambulatory providers, timely 
ambulatory provider follow-up, and postdischarge home visits;  bridging interventions 
including transition coaches, physician continuity across the inpatient and outpatient setting, 
and patient-centered discharge instruction. They conclude from empirical studies is that no 
single intervention alone was associated with reduced risk for 30 day re-hospitalization. 
However, none of the literature above assessed the effectiveness of the HRRP program directly. 
3. Data 
 
The main data source for this paper is the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council 
(PHC4). PHC4 has data on inpatient characteristics--such as age, race, gender, diagnosis and 
procedure codes and hospital ID. Since the HRRP went into effect in October 2012, I include 
data three quarters before and after the fourth quarter of 2012. Because I am using a difference 
in differences approach, the fourth quarter of 2012 is dropped. Therefore, I have data from the 
first quarter of 2012 through the third quarter of 2013, except for the fourth quarter of 2012.  
                                                     
2 List of papers: Atienza et al., 2004; Bourbeau, Julien, Maltais, & et al., 2003; Brandao et al., 2014; Butler & 
Kalogeropoulos, 2012; Costantino, Frey, Hall, & Painter, 2013; Daly, Douglas, Kelley, O’Toole, & 
Montenegro, 2005; Epstein, Jha, & Orav, 2011; Feltner et al., 2014; Fonarow et al., 1997; Gattis, Hasselblad, 
Whellan, & O'Connor, 1999; Jack et al., 2009; Jha , Orav , & Epstein 2009; Kaboli et al., 2012; Koehler et al., 
2009; Kripalani, Theobald, Anctil, & Vasilevskis, 2014; Krumholz et al., 2011; Lawson et al., 2013; 
Marcantonio et al., 1999; Mayo, Richman, & Harris, 1990; McCarthy, Johnson, & Audet, 2013; Novak, 
Hastanan, Moradi, & Terry, 2012; Puhan, Scharplatz, Troosters, & Steurer, 2005; Rich, 2003; Rich  et al., 1995; 
Shih, Ryan, Gonzalez, & Dimick, 2015; Tuso et al., 2013; Williams, 2013. 
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I focus on AMI and heart failure patients in Pennsylvania. I divide hospitals into three 
groups based on their average Medicare population prior to the introduction of the HRRP. The 
treatment group is defined as the top tercile and the control group is defined as the bottom 
tercile.  
After excluding observations with missing values, Table 3.1 reports the summary 
statistics. The treatment group has more White patients and fewer Black and Asian. The 
treatment group also has a higher average age which is expected since the treatment group has 
a higher than average Medicare population. I specifically want to point out that the Charlson 
index, which is an indication of comorbidity seriousness, is very similar in both groups. 
Table 3.2 lists the control variables and compares the pre-treatment summary statistics 
of the treatment and control group. Similarly to Table 3.1, the treatment group has a higher 
average age. The treatment group also has slightly more white patients and fewer black patients. 
Later, I will perform a formal test to prove that the treatment and control groups share a 
common pre-treatment trend.  
4. Empirical Models 
 
The main empirical model in this paper is  
𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡
′ + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼ℎ + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡, (1)  
where 𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑡 is the readmission dummy variable for patient i of hospital h in time t. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ is a 
dummy variable for whether hospital h is in the treatment group and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 indicates whether 
period t is after the implementation of the HRRP. 𝛽1 is the difference-in-differences coefficient 
and it captures the difference between the effects of the HRRP on the treatment and control 
groups. 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡
′   is a vector of patient characteristics for age, race and the Charlson index. 𝛼ℎ is 
the hospital fixed effect, whereas 𝛾𝑡 is the time fixed effect.
3  𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡  represents the error term.  
                                                     
3 I use the quarter fixed effect in the main model and year fixed effect in the robustness check. 
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HRRP defines readmission as an admission to a subsection hospital within 30 days of 
a discharge. 4 Since I only have information on quarter of admission, I define readmission as 
an admission to a subsection hospital within a quarter of a discharge. CMS has adopted 
readmission measures for applicable conditions such as AMI and HF and hence my patient 
sample are those diagnosed with AMI and HF.  
HRRP adopted the risk adjustment methodology endorsed by the National Quality 
Forum for the readmission measures to calculate the readmission ratios, which includes 
adjustments for factors that are clinically relevant, including certain patient demographic 
characteristics and comorbidity. For this reason, I include the patients’ demographic 
characteristics and Charlson index which is a measurement of comorbidity in my regression 
equation. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. The number of clusters is large 
enough to waive the need of using the t-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of clusters minus one as the hypothesis testing distribution. The standard normal 
distribution is assumed.  
In order to show the common pre-treatment trend, I use the following model: 
𝑌ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛼ℎ + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽−2𝐷−2ℎ + 𝛽−1𝐷−1ℎ + 𝛽1𝐷1ℎ + 𝛽2𝐷2ℎ + 𝛽3𝐷3ℎ + 𝜀ℎ𝑡 
where 𝑌ℎ𝑡 is the average readmission ratio for hospital h in time t. 𝛼ℎ is the hospital fixed effect 
and 𝛾𝑡 is the quarterly time fixed effect. 𝐷−2ℎ is the interaction between the quarter time 
dummy and treatment indicator. The -2 indicates that it is two quarters prior to the treatment. 
Similar definitions also apply to 𝐷−1ℎ, 𝐷1ℎ, 𝐷2ℎ, and 𝐷3ℎ, where positive numbers indicate the 
number of quarters after the treatment. If the outcome trends between treatment and control 
groups are the same, then 𝛽−2 and 𝛽−1 should be insignificant.  
5. Robustness Check 
                                                     
4 ARRA defines a hospital as a Medicare subsection (d) hospital, which is a general, acute care, short-term 
hospital. 
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I estimate several variations of equation (1) as robustness checks. First, I changed the quarterly 
trend to a yearly trend in case the trend only appears on an annual basis. If the trend only 
happens at a broader time window, the annual trend should be more appropriate. Next, I use 
age groups instead of age and age squared to capture the effect of age. Third, I change the cutoff 
of the treatment and control groups from tercile of the percentage of the Medicare patients to 
the median of the percentage of the Medicare patients.  Finally, I change the cutoff of the 
treatment and control groups again to the mean value of the Medicare patient’s percentages. 
6. Results 
 
Pre-treatment test results are presented in Table 3.3. None of the coefficients are statistically 
significant. Therefore, the “parallel path” assumption necessary for using a difference in 
differences model is confirmed.  
The main results are shown in Table 3.4.  The baseline specification is equation (1) without 
the Charlson index, hospital fixed effects and time fixed effects. Column 1 is the difference in 
differences coefficient. I added the Charlson index to control the effect of patients’ comorbidity 
in specification 2. In specification 3, I add the hospital fixed effects and lastly I add time fixed 
effects at a quarterly level in specification 4. Based on the results in column 1, none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant. Based on the results in column 2 of Table 3.4, the 
treatment group tends to have a higher readmission rate. This result is not surprising since 
treatment hospitals have more Medicare patients who tend to be elderly and are more likely to 
be readmitted.  
Robustness checks are presented in Table 3.5 and all the changes are made based on 
specification 4 in Table 3-4: changing the quarterly fixed effects to yearly fixed effects, using 
age categories instead of actual age, using the median of Medicare patients’ percentage as the 
cutoff for treatment and control groups and using the mean of Medicare patients’ percentage as 
the cutoff. None of these variations leads to a significant difference-in-differences coefficient. 
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However, the last three variations lead to a significant treatment coefficient which indicates 
that hospitals in the treatment group tend to have a higher readmission rate. Together those 
results suggest that HRRP is not effective in the longer time span (i.e. three quarters after the 
policy implementation).  
7. Conclusion 
Reducing hospital readmissions has long been a health policy goal because it presents an 
opportunity to lower health care expenses and improve patients’ quality of life. CMS 
implemented the HRRP to accomplish such a goal. This paper uses PHC4 data to examine the 
effectiveness of the HRRP in the longer run.  
I fail to find any persistent significant effects from the HRRP. Given that there are 
papers suggesting that hospitals are responsive to HRRP to reduce the readmissions within one 
month of discharge, it is possible that hospitals are postponing the readmissions. I do not find 
any literature that specifically focuses on diffusion speed in the health care system but such 
insignificant effect can come from the slow diffusion speed of medical technology or systems 
(i.e. hospitals upgrade their systems or technology slowly) or the lagging time effect (i.e. it 
takes time for the effect of certain changes to show up). Research focusing on the long run is 
much needed to accurately measure the effect of the HRRP.  
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics   
 
Total Treatment Control  
Readmission Dummy  0.1274 0.1433 0.1132 
 (0.3334) (0.3503) (0.3168) 
Race_white 0.8668 0.9103 0.8277 
 (0.3398) (0.2857) (0.3776) 
Race_black 0.0848 0.0617 0.1055 
 (0.2786) (0.2406) (0.3072) 
Race_asian 0.0049 0.0038 0.0059 
 (0.0700) (0.0616) (0.0768) 
Male dummy 0.5504 0.5046 0.5914 
 (0.4975) (0.5000) (0.4916) 
Age  70.4310 74.1296 67.1149 
 (16.0811) (14.3934) (16.7769) 
Charlson Index 1.6715 1.7135 1.6339 
 (0.4949) (0.4644) (0.5179) 
Number of Observations 43811 20711 23100 
Only hospitals which occupy the top and the bottom tercile percentage of Medicare patients are included. Standard errors are in the 
parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Pre-Treatment Means and Standard Deviations 
 Treatment Control  
Readmission Dummy  0.1478 0.1140 
 (0.3549) (0.3178) 
Race_white 0.9131 0.8309 
 (0.2817) (0.3749) 
Race_black 0.0604 0.1058 
 (0.2383) (0.3076) 
Race_asian 0.0035 0.0060 
 (0.0592) (0.0770) 
Male dummy 0.5056 0.5879 
 (0.5000) (0.4922) 
Age  74.2035 67.0410 
 (14.4052) (16.6664) 
Charlson Index 1.7114 1.6328 
 (0.4655) (0.5146) 
Number of Observations 10242 11221 
Only hospitals which occupy the top and the bottom tercile percentage of Medicare patients are included. Standard errors are in the 
parenthesis.  
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Table 3.3 Common Pre-Trend Test 
 Coefficient Standard Errors 
 𝛽−2 0.0267954 0.0466262 
𝛽−1 0.0246234 0.0464395 
𝛽1 0.0029508 0.0463986 
𝛽2 -0.0228089 0.0464521   
𝛽3 0.0185511 0.0463626 
Hospital and quarter time fixed effects are included as controls. Number of observations is 1016. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
.  
 
 
Table 3.4 Effects of Readmission Reduction Program 
      Treat*After         Treat        After 
1.Baseline Specification -0.0075 0.0318** -0.0016 
 (0.0061) (0.0104) (0.0040) 
2. With Charlson index -0.0076 0.0306** -0.0017 
 (0.0306) (0.0103) (0.0040) 
3.Hospital Fixed Effects -0.0049 0.1045*** -0.0038 
 (0.0060) (0.0129) (0.0039) 
4.Quarterly Fixed Effects -0.0048 0.1015*** -0.0078 
 (0.0060) (0.0131) (0.0059) 
Race is included as one of the controls and classified as White, Black, Asian and others. The other controls included in all models are age 
and male dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5  Robustness Check 
 Treat*After Treat After 
1. Change quarter trend to year trend  -0.0025 0.0171 -0.0025 
 (0.0056) (0.0117) (0.0036) 
2. Use age categories instead the actual age and age square -0.0020 0.0262*** -0.0060 
 (0.0056) (0.0117) (0.0049) 
3. Use median as the cutoff of the treatment and control group -0.0042 0.0865*** -0.0033 
 (0.0058) (0.0103) (0.0058) 
4. Use mean as the cutoff of the treatment and control group 0.0002 0.0885*** -0.0102 
 (0.0071) (0.0129) (0.0066) 
Race is included as one of the controls and classified as White, Black, Asian and others. The other controls included in all models are age 
and male dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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